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We report on a longitudinal study of the emergence of the ATLAS detector, a complex technological system developedat CERN, Geneva. Our data show that the coordination of initial architectural choices was driven by cycles of con-
testation and justification that resulted in the creation of what we term interlaced knowledge—pockets of shared knowledge
interwoven within and across subsystem communities at ATLAS. We also found that these justifications were possible
because of the presence of a boundary infrastructure that served as a common substrate of knowledge for all ATLAS
participants. Together, the boundary infrastructure and interlaced knowledge enabled participants to make co-oriented tech-
nological choices, address latent interdependencies, and minimize the incidence and severity of glitches when integrating
the various subsystems.
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Introduction
The emergence of complex technological systems is of
considerable interest to many scholars of technology and
innovation management, and rightly so. The successful
development of such systems is key to solving com-
plex scientific puzzles, improving social welfare, and
sustaining competitive advantage. In addition, processes
underlying the emergence of these technological systems
entail experimentation and adjustments that can serve as
the basis for organizational transformation.
Although their outcomes can be beneficial, pro-
cesses by which such complex systems emerge are
not straightforward. Consider, for instance, the case
of ATLAS, a new particle detector system that was
employed recently to discover the Higgs boson.1 Nearly
3,000 experts hailing from diverse subfields of physics
and engineering and working at 175 independent insti-
tutions around the world volunteered their time and spe-
cialized knowledge to design and deploy this complex
system over an 18-year period through scientific collabo-
ration. The system’s unprecedented scale and complexity
meant that existing knowledge and expertise were insuf-
ficient to guide its design and development. Yet choices
had to be made among new, competing designs for each
component. It was difficult to evaluate the performance
of components beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the
choice of one component affected the choice of others,
as well as the ways in which the various components
could be connected. In other words, the system’s archi-
tecture was not given, thereby precluding coordination of
system development through agreed-upon, stable inter-
faces between various components (what Sanchez and
Mahoney 1996 labeled as “embedded coordination”).
Furthermore, the collaboration was not governed by a
formal hierarchy typically associated with coordinat-
ing complex tasks (Zhou 2013). Indeed, the uncertain-
ties and complexities were such that no single “systems
integrator” (Brusoni et al. 2001) possessed the knowl-
edge required to mandate choices and direct system
development.
How can actors with diverse backgrounds collabo-
rate to develop a complex technological system when
its architecture is not given, component technologies are
uncertain, and coordination through hierarchy or by a
systems integrator is not feasible? To answer this ques-
tion, we conducted an in-depth longitudinal study of the
emergence of the ATLAS detector. Our study led to sev-
eral findings: First, ATLAS participants could coordinate
their activities because of a “boundary infrastructure”
(Bowker and Star 1999) comprising, among other assets,
texts, tools, and simulation models, which served as
a common substrate of knowledge that was transpar-
ent and accessible to everyone. All of these together
enabled some degree of tacit coordination by making
it possible for interdependent participants to interpret
and anticipate each other’s actions (Puranam et al. 2009,
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Srikanth and Puranam 2011). Second, besides enabling
such tacit coordination, the boundary infrastructure
also allowed ATLAS participants to engage in a pro-
cess of explication within forums designed to evalu-
ate competing technological options through cycles of
contestation and justification. Such explication through
contestation and justification allowed members of dif-
ferent communities within ATLAS to gain a deeper
appreciation of relevant knowledge assets possessed by
other interdependent communities. As a result, pock-
ets of shared knowledge emerged across the different
ATLAS communities; we call this interlaced knowledge.
This interlaced knowledge enabled ATLAS participants
to pragmatically decompose (Simon 1962) the system
so that communities could work on different subsys-
tems in a distributed yet parallel fashion. Realizing that
any such decomposition could only be provisional given
numerous uncertainties and potential latent interdepen-
dencies, the different communities continued to com-
municate and interact with one another, thereby further
enhancing interlaced knowledge. This, in turn, enabled
them to address latent interdependencies and minimize
the incidence and severity of “glitches” (Hoopes and
Postrel 1999) when the various subsystems eventually
were integrated.
To better place our research in context, we begin by
reviewing the literature on the challenges of collabo-
ration during the emergence of complex technological
systems. Next, we provide more details on the research
site and the specific methods that we used to explore
our research question. Then, we describe what hap-
pened at ATLAS and highlight our key findings—first
the results of our longitudinal study and then the results
of additional semantic and scientometric analyses to pro-
visionally validate the findings of our inductive analysis.
Finally, the discussion and conclusion sections locate
these findings in existing conversations and lay out their
implications for relevant literatures.
Literature Review
A rich body of work has emerged that adds depth and
nuance to our understanding of the emergence of com-
plex technological systems. For instance, one way to
deal with system complexity is to partition the system
into components (or modules) that need only inter-
act with one another through agreed-upon and well-
specified interfaces (Baldwin and Clark 2000, Garud and
Kumaraswamy 1995, Simon 1962, Ulrich 1995). Prior
research has noted that such partitioning typically results
in a hierarchy of system components, with choices made
for components at the apex of the hierarchy influenc-
ing choices further down the hierarchy (Clark 1985).
Complementing these observations are those offered by
scholars who noted that “core” components (i.e., those
that are tightly coupled with others) must first stabi-
lize before design parameters for peripheral components
can be set (Tushman and Murmann 1998, Tushman and
Rosenkopf 1992).
A parallel stream of research has examined the social
dynamics of collaboration shaping the emergence of
complex technological systems (e.g., Colfer and Baldwin
2010, Hoopes and Postrel 1999). As Tushman and
Rosenkopf (1992) noted, when multiple parties design
complex technological systems, decisions are not purely
technical in nature but also revolve around the self-
interest of involved actors. This is the challenge of
cooperation—i.e., aligning interests among interdepen-
dent actors (Gulati and Singh 1998, Hoopes and Postrel
1999). Cooperation challenges emerge because different
actors find it difficult to balance their personal inter-
ests with overall project concerns. Controversies around
technological alternatives and the various dimensions of
merit that are critical to system performance (Anderson
and Tushman 1990, Garud et al. 2002, Tushman and
Rosenkopf 1992) can result in excessive haggling and
long delays (Farrell and Saloner 1988, Genschel 1997).
Besides cooperation, there are coordination challenges
associated with synchronizing the activities of multi-
ple interdependent actors in the design, development,
and deployment of a complex system (Camerer and
Knez 1996, Hoopes and Postrel 1999, Puranam et al.
2012).2 One option is for interdependent actors to con-
form to an established architecture.3 A second option
is for an architecture to be prespecified at the outset
by a systems integrator (Brusoni et al. 2001). In either
case, a stabilized architecture can allow actors to coor-
dinate their activities, as they need only to build com-
ponents conforming to agreed-upon interfaces. Sanchez
and Mahoney (1996) called this embedded coordination,
because each actor knows what must be accomplished
without the overt exercise of managerial authority. Relat-
edly, synchronization of activities occurs by specifying
and then adhering to temporal coordination mechanisms
such as the use of PERT/CPM (project evaluation and
review technique/critical path method) charts (Yakura
2002) or time pacing (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997).
These options are possible once a system architec-
ture has been specified and agreed upon, but they are
not available when the architecture, i.e., the compo-
nents and the connections between them (Henderson and
Clark 1990), is emerging. Complicating matters, many
potential options for each component and connection
may exist, with the choice of any single component
impacting options for other interdependent components
(Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004). The problem is magnified
when the design and development of the system requires
diverse and specialized knowledge possessed by differ-
ent communities of practice (Brown and Duguid 1991,
Lave and Wenger 1991). In this situation, no single
systems integrator may have the wherewithal to develop
an understanding of all system components and their
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potential interdependencies, what Postrel (2002) referred
to as “trans-specialist” understanding.
How do actors coordinate their activities to develop
a system’s architecture under these circumstances? One
way to address this challenge is for interdependent actors
to develop what Puranam et al. (2012, p. 420) labeled
“predictive knowledge,” i.e., knowledge “that enables
one agent to act as though he or she can accurately
predict another agent’s actions.” Predictive knowledge,
then, can serve as a substitute for architectural knowl-
edge (Puranam et al. 2012). Such predictive knowl-
edge becomes all the more possible when “common
ground” exists among interdependent actors involved in
system development. Common ground has been defined
as “knowledge that is shared and known to be shared”
(Srikanth and Puranam 2011, p. 850).4 As Colfer and
Baldwin (2010, p. 20) explained, common ground is
required because “contributors need to be able to ‘speak
the same language’ in terms of how they explain and
interpret designs. They also need to be able to anticipate
when, where, and how to look for design information
from their counterparts.”5
Although predictive knowledge is useful for iden-
tifying focal point solutions (Puranam et al. 2012),
challenges arise when the underlying technologies are
untested. Besides uncertainties about the feasibility and
expected performance of these technologies, there are
uncertainties about how different groups will come
together to support and develop potentially viable
choices. In such situations, no “demonstrably correct”
solution (Laughlin and Ellis 1986, p. 177) that can serve
as a focal point exists at the outset, because latent inter-
dependencies and adjustments (of both the technologies
involved and the preferences of the participants) that
shape system configuration can occur only as develop-
ment unfolds (Alexander 1964, Barry and Rerup 2006,
Garud and Munir 2008, Pickering 1993). Under these
conditions, the design of a complex system becomes
a “judgmental task,” i.e., a task “for which there does
not exist a demonstrably correct answer” (Laughlin and
Ellis 1986, p. 177).
Moreover, when the proposed system is radically new,
existing knowledge and expertise may not be sufficient
to guide its design and development. So it may not be
possible for actors to simply take one another’s expertise
for granted and rely on others’ decisions (what Hardwig
1985 called “epistemic dependence”). Indeed, the very
notion of what constitutes relevant expertise is contin-
gent and coemergent with the complex system (Garud
and Munir 2008).6 For instance, early in the process,
when specific technologies, components, and the con-
nections (i.e., interfaces) between them have not yet
been chosen, it is unclear what specific expertise will be
necessary for identifying or resolving conflicts and who
will have that required expertise (if at all). Relying on
predetermined notions of expertise in such a situation
may lead to suboptimal choices and the premature sta-
bilization of system architecture, potentially generat-
ing unproductive interdependencies (Staudenmayer et al.
2005) and a higher incidence of systemwide glitches
ex post (Hoopes and Postrel 1999).
Under these circumstances, actors belonging to
different epistemic communities must jointly and
simultaneously accommodate interdependencies across
community boundaries to cocreate the architecture
(Garud and Karnoe 2003). Such integration of knowl-
edge across “epistemic communities” (Bechky 2003,
Knorr-Cetina 1999), which is required to make such
accommodations possible, poses nontrivial challenges
(Knorr-Cetina 1999). Specifically, it will be difficult for
members of a given epistemic community to appreci-
ate or use knowledge developed by other communities
without understanding the assumptions and the meth-
ods underpinning that knowledge. This difficulty may
arise because of semantic and syntactic differences in
the language employed by different epistemic communi-
ties (Carlile 2002). In addition, it may arise because of
pragmatic differences attributable to the differing tools,
evaluation criteria, and belief systems of the different
communities (Carlile 2002, Garud and Rappa 1994). In
fact, attempts to communicate across epistemic bound-
aries by relying on knowledge transfer alone (i.e., with-
out sufficient understanding of the context in which the
knowledge emerged) can generate dysfunctional con-
flict and divergence rather than cooperation and conver-
gence (Latour 2004, Star and Griesemer 1989). It is for
this reason that Bechky (2003) proposed a process of
knowledge transformation (as opposed to just transfer)
to enable cocreation across epistemic communities (see
also Knorr-Cetina 1999).
Given these observations on the critical role of exper-
tise, knowledge, and their integration, we can further
refine the broader research question on coordination that
we had posed earlier. Specifically, how can actors from
different epistemic communities resolve the knowledge
integration challenges that arise in the cocreation of a
complex system’s architecture when there is fundamen-
tal uncertainty about the system’s components and con-
nections among them? We address this question through
a longitudinal study of the emergence of the ATLAS
particle detector at CERN. Our choice of a longitudi-
nal frame is informed by an appreciation that different
mechanisms may play a role at different points in time in
the emergence of a complex technological system. Even
though existing literature has recognized the importance
of knowledge integration to reduce the possibility of
glitches, how such knowledge integration can be accom-
plished and how it unfolds over time during a complex
system’s design and development remain underexamined.
Research Site and Methods
We had the opportunity to conduct a longitudinal study
of the emergence of ATLAS, the large-scale particle
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detector located at CERN, that recently was used to
detect the Higgs boson, one of the more significant dis-
coveries in physics during the past 50 years. The detec-
tor (with a notional cost estimated at one billion dollars)
is the culmination of a project begun in 1992 to detect
the subatomic particles created by particle beam colli-
sions in the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). By 2007,
Figure 1 Overview of the ATLAS Detector
Subsystems Description
Calorimeter system
• Liquid argon calorimeter
• Tile calorimeter
• The calorimeter consists of metal plates (absorbers) and sensing elements to measure the
energy of charged and neutral particles. Interactions in the absorbers transform the
incident energy into a “shower” of particles that is detected by the sensing elements.
• In the inner sections, the sensing element is liquid argon, i.e., the liquid argon calorimeter.
The showers in the argon liberate electrons that are collected and recorded.
• In the outer sections, the sensors are tiles of scintillating plastic, i.e., the tile calorimeter.




• The muon spectrometer surrounds the calorimeter and measures muon paths to determine
their momentum with high precision.
• In precision chambers, gas-filled metal tubes with wires running down their axes are used
as sensors. High voltage between the wire and the tube wall allows detection of the
traversing muons by the electrical pulses they produce. With careful timing of the pulses,
muon positions can be measured to an accuracy of 0.1 mm. The reconstructed muon path
determines its momentum and charge.
• Trigger chambers are based on a similar principle; however, high time resolution (rather
than precision) is the key feature of trigger chambers. Using thin plates or multiple wires
as sensors, trigger chambers have a time resolution better than 25 ns.
Inner detector
• Pixel detector
• Semiconductor tracker (SCT)
• Transition radiation tracker (TRT)
• The ATLAS inner detector combines high-resolution detectors at the inner radii with
continuous tracking elements at the outer radii, all contained in the central solenoid.
• The pixel detector generates a set of high-precision measurements that enable the inner
detector to find short-lived particles such as B hadrons.
• The SCT system is designed to provide a set of precision measurements in the
intermediate radial range, contributing to the measurement of momentum, impact
parameter, and vertex position.
• At larger radii, typically 36 tracking points are provided by the TRT. The TRT is based on
the use of straw detectors, which can operate at high rates. They also identify electrons by
detecting transition radiation photons created in a radiator between the straws.
Source. ATLAS Experiment © 2013 CERN.
construction was complete, and the detector was com-
missioned for calibration and “data taking.” The focus of
this study is on the early design and development phase
when the architecture of the ATLAS detector was still
emerging.
The detector (see Figure 1), a complex technological
system that is 45 meters long and 25 meters in diameter
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and weighs about 7,000 tons, is housed in an eight-story
underground cavern. It consists of subsystems, each of
which is a complex system in itself, that identify differ-
ent types of particles created when proton beams collide,
based on energy and momentum measurements.
To design, build, and commission the detector, a
tremendous collaborative effort was required over a
period of 18 years involving several thousand scien-
tists and engineers with diverse expertise in the areas
of physics, engineering, and computer science. Because
of the unprecedented size and scope of the project, and
uncertainties about the underlying physics, previous gen-
eration designs could not be reused for the ATLAS
detector. Groups of scientists and engineers, affiliated
with 175 independent institutions distributed across
38 different countries (and bound together only by a
nonenforceable memorandum of understanding rather
than by a traditional hierarchy), collaboratively designed
and built the various ATLAS subsystems before shipping
them to Geneva for assembly. Eventually, all of these
subsystems had to be lowered into a cavern 100 meters
underground and installed in the right sequence akin to
building a ship in a bottle. Once installed, replacing a
subsystem or component was exceedingly difficult and
time consuming.
Data Collection
Scholars who studied large-scale projects and orga-
nizations similar to ATLAS (Latour 1987, Pickering
1993) suggested focusing on critical events such as
technological challenges to understand the core con-
stitutive dynamics of collaborations. Indeed, given the
complexities of ATLAS and the uncertainties about
the underlying technologies, there were many critical
technological challenges pertaining to various compo-
nents and their connections. For a systematic study of
these critical events, we relied primarily on archival
data from CERN’s archives. These data were gener-
ated and archived in real time by participants and rep-
resent “unobtrusive measures” (Webb and Weick 1979).
We also complemented these 20 years of archival data
(1991–2010) with 6 years of contemporary data such
as interviews and field visits (2005–2010) (please see
Table 1 for a summary).
The archival materials include hundreds of documents
such as transparencies presented at meetings, meeting
minutes, and internal documents pertaining to central
issues and decisions. The materials also include presen-
tations made by scientists to the ATLAS collaboration as
a whole and to other scientists at professional gatherings.
It should be noted that ATLAS participants routinely
documented and archived anything they considered to
be relevant to the collaboration’s progress. In addition to
data from the CERN archives, we gained access to per-
sonal notes written by participating scientists and engi-
neers. These personal notes offered insights into the
micro details of system emergence that were not read-
ily apparent in the meeting minutes and other archival
sources from CERN. Electronic mailing list archives that
captured real-time conversations among ATLAS partici-
pants complemented these rich data.
To complement this wealth of archival data and per-
sonal notes created by participants in real time, and
as a part of a larger study, we carried out 108 exten-
sive in-depth interviews with a cross-section of scientists
and engineers from different subsystem communities
and groups within the ATLAS collaboration. Follow-
ing Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) guidelines for “purpose-
ful sampling,” we interviewed participants who were
involved in deliberations around technological chal-
lenges. We began by interviewing participants whose
names were listed in the meeting minutes and then
employed a snowballing technique to identify and inter-
view others. The interview process itself was iterative.
For instance, we gathered and analyzed archival material
pertaining to events identified by our informants. Then,
we sought additional informants based on information
found in archival records. We continued this process
until we reached data and theoretical saturation (Strauss
and Corbin 1998).
The copious data from archival sources and personal
notes created by participants in real time already con-
tained many details of the technological challenges asso-
ciated with the detector architecture’s emergence. The
interviews we conducted allowed us to gain a deeper
understanding of what had transpired. Specifically, they
helped us make sense of the technical details, culture,
and governance at ATLAS during the period of our
study. In addition, they served to validate our identifica-
tion and interpretations from the archival records of var-
ious critical events during the emergence of the detector
architecture. Many of our informants had been associ-
ated with ATLAS from a very early stage and had no
difficulty remembering various technological challenges
(such as around the “air core toroid decision” or the
“inner detector cooling review,” discussed later in this
paper). Their accounts were consistent with one another
and with the archival records, further increasing our con-
fidence in the reliability and validity of the data.
To get a sense of how ATLAS operates on a day-
to-day basis, we attended conferences and participated
in meetings during 12 field visits, each typically last-
ing a week starting in 2006. We also took advantage of
chance encounters and engaged in many informal con-
versations with participants in the ATLAS collaboration.
Both during and after these interactions, we also took
detailed notes. These field visits gave us a deep appreci-
ation of the culture of collaboration at ATLAS that had
emerged and been sustained over many years. The data
analysis and results of our study are based on this over-
all corpus of data and our in-depth understanding of the
research site.
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Table 1 Sources of Data for This Study
Data source Description Use of data
Plenary meeting
documents
Summaries of 65 meetings of the ATLAS plenary
and supplementary material (presented slides
and reports). The ATLAS plenary was the main
forum for all-hands discussions concerning
physics objectives and results, hardware and
software design, and organizational matters.
Plenary meetings usually spanned 5 days and
were held during ATLAS Week. Our data
covers the period 1992–2010.
We used these minutes to identify major events
relevant to our study. The “ATLAS Constitution”
stipulates that all major decisions must be
discussed in the plenary meeting before being
voted on by the collaboration board, making
the plenary minutes a particularly useful source
for generating a chronology of events.
Collaboration board
meetings minutes
Minutes of 68 meetings of the collaboration
board, the policy- and decision-making body of
ATLAS. The minutes extensively list the main
issues (including technical as well as social
issues) discussed and decisions made
between 1992 and 2010.
These data complemented data from plenary
meetings with additional details on issues
raised in the plenary that were further




Minutes of 155 meetings of the executive board.
This forum reviewed schedules and milestones
and the use of financial and human resources.
These minutes cover the years 1994–2010.
These data were used to identify controversies
that emerged between various ATLAS
subsystems. The executive board had the
mandate to bring together coordinators of
various subsystem work programs, making it
an excellent source for this purpose.
Review panel meetings
documents
Minutes of 40 review panel meetings,
presentations, and reports discussed during
the meetings, as well as the personal notes of
a senior scientist who attended all meetings.
These forums were set up to choose from
alternative designs for the three main detector
subsystems and the magnet system. Our data
covered all review panels that took place
between 1993 and 1994.
These data enabled us to study in detail the
dialectical process involved in choosing among
competing designs for a specific detector
subsystem. Because all review panels took
place at about the same time and followed a
similar protocol, we were able to conduct a
systematic comparison to find similarities and
differences between subsystem groups.
Electronic mailing list
archives
The electronic mailing list archives containing
128,015 items sent between 1993 and 2005
captured real-time conversations among ATLAS
scientists throughout the project.
These data were used to gain additional insights
on details of specific incidents and for
triangulation. Because these messages were
sent in real time when critical events unfolded,
these data were not subject to retrospective
bias. Moreover, these data offered more details
and diverse views of different groups involved
than meeting minutes, which sometimes only
summarized what all groups involved agreed
upon.
Full-text ATLAS Notes ATLAS Notes documents (2,419 in total) that had
been generated in the review panels and task
forces across each subsystem. ATLAS
documented all of the proceedings of review
panels and task forces. Our data covered the
years 1992–2005.
We conducted a computer linguistic analysis of
the ATLAS Notes. Analyzing this large amount
of full-text data allowed us to systematically
compare differences in levels of justification of
various subsystem groups, thereby probing




The CERN Document Server (CDS), an electronic
document repository, was used as source of
bibliographic data for 2,419 ATLAS Notes. The
data covered all ATLAS Notes generated in the
years 1992–2005.
Documents stored in the CDS are catalogued
according to the MARC standard specified by
the Library of Congress, which guarantees a
consistent data structure for conducting
scientometric analysis, a means of analyzing





The ATLAS PPT database offers detailed data on
work packages, milestones, and schedules. It
was used as a source for information regarding
the progress of the development process within
the various subsystems and provided insights
on unexpected technical problems and delays.
Our data covered the period from the
introduction of the database in 1997 until 2007.
We used these data to analyze how the
development process unfolded in different
detector subsystems and ATLAS overall. Data
on unexpected technical problems, delays,
and missed milestones allowed us to infer how
effectively the various groups were able to
coordinate and handle unexpected challenges
as the project unfolded.
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Data source Description Use of data
In-depth interviews We conducted 84 semistructured interviews with
scientists and engineers involved in the ATLAS
collaboration at different stages. Some individuals
were interviewed on multiple occasions. These
interviews typically lasted for 45–90 minutes. In
addition, we conducted 24 interviews that began as
informal conversations during field visits but, during
the conversation, turned out to be valuable sources
of data on specific incidents. The content of these
interviews was captured in detailed field notes. The
interviews were conducted between 2005 and 2010.
These interviews helped us make sense of many
technical details and provided additional insights on
several controversies and differences in opinions
during the emergence of ATLAS. To avoid
retrospective bias, these interviews were not used
as a primary source of data; rather, they were used
to complement our findings based on archival data.
We transcribed and coded the interviews using
NVivo and cross-checked for accuracy with
respondents via email when we found
inconsistencies.
Field visits ATLAS scientists invited us to make field visits to
understand and experience firsthand the
mechanisms that they have continued to use from
their very inception. Accordingly, during 12 field
visits, each typically lasting a week, we had the
opportunity to observe conferences, participate in
meetings, and engage in many informal
conversations. These field visits took place between
2005 and 2010.
During our research project, scientists at ATLAS had
already begun working on an upgrade of the
detector to be installed after 2015. For this reason,
we could observe in real time several mechanisms
that were similar to the ones unfolding during the
early phases of the collaboration.
Data Analysis
Following suggestions made by scholars (Latour 1987,
Pickering 1993), we began by examining the technolog-
ical challenges that participants encountered and how
they were addressed. The archival documents we exam-
ined revealed that technological challenges had been
discussed in several different forums such as working
groups, review panels, or plenary meetings. Our analysis
of these documents yielded issues such as differences
in opinion, conflicts that arose regarding the detector
architecture, and the choices that were made. Each issue
documented in the meeting minutes usually included
referrals to discussions in other meetings and/or doc-
uments. To enable us to search for events across our
complete database, we digitized archival records using
optical character recognition software and indexed our
data using a desktop search engine. From this, we were
able to identify relevant data not referenced in meeting
minutes, such as emails and personal notes of partici-
pants. Moreover, the people we interviewed confirmed
that the resolution of the technological challenges that
the collaboration encountered was critical to the emer-
gence of the detector architecture. Finding such mutually
confirming evidence from multiple sources increased our
confidence in the quality, depth, and validity of our data
and analysis.
We also studied documents such as the ATLAS Let-
ter of Intent, ATLAS Technical Proposal, and Technical
Design Reports for individual detector subsystems.
These detailed descriptions of technological concepts
and design considerations represented snapshots of the
detector architecture in the years 1992, 1994, and 1997,
providing the development context and enabling us
to trace how the detector architecture had emerged
over time.
Triangulating across the data sources, we generated
a chronology of events as a way to trace and under-
stand the mechanisms that participants used to collabo-
rate over time (see Appendix A for an abbreviated list of
events). Consistent with a process perspective, we con-
sidered each event as an important occurrence within a
larger flow (Van de Ven 1992), an approach that led to
a deeper understanding of the unfolding processes. Fol-
lowing recommendations offered by Langley (1999), we
also drew diagrams to enable a holistic understanding of
the flow of events (see Appendix B for an example).
We coded the data for thematic content (Miles and
Huberman 1984) by abstracting raw quotations and text
segments from our interviews and from archival mate-
rials. In particular, we studied how technological chal-
lenges arose and were addressed and resolved as the
advocates of different technological solutions confronted
one another during meetings and review panels. We per-
formed pattern coding (Miles and Huberman 1984) to
identify emergent themes and explanations. Tentative
insights emerged as we engaged with the data—e.g.,
that justification, which enabled coordination, also gen-
erated pockets of shared knowledge interwoven within
and across different ATLAS subsystem communities.
We decided to further validate these insights by tak-
ing advantage of a natural experiment that enabled us to
study the pattern unfolding across different ATLAS sub-
system communities (Trochim 1989). Specifically, we
compared levels of justification and the knowledge struc-
tures that emerged over time within and across differ-
ent ATLAS subsystem communities.7 To do so, we used
“latent semantic analysis” (Deerwester et al. 1990), a
natural language processing technique that makes it pos-
sible to extract latent semantic concepts from a large
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corpus of texts and to compare the prevalence of spe-
cific semantic concepts across different documents. This
approach enabled us to explore the prevalence of justifi-
cations in the documents produced by ATLAS scientists
within each community during the development process.
For this, we used a combination of co-word analysis
(Callon et al. 1986) and coauthorship analysis (Palla
et al. 2007) to identify all knowledge domains rele-
vant for the development of ATLAS (as represented by
the ATLAS Notes) and to infer which knowledge assets
were held by the participants involved and which knowl-
edge assets they shared and with whom. By doing so,
we were able to depict and compare the structure of the
distributed yet collective knowledge that emerged over
time within and across the communities that were work-
ing on different ATLAS subsystems.8
On various occasions, we had the opportunity to
present our findings and interpretations to ATLAS par-
ticipants who validated the results of our analysis and
our interpretations. They also offered us useful feedback
that we incorporated into our analysis. Our interactions
with these scientists and engineers increased our confi-
dence in the data we had gathered, the analysis we had
conducted, and the inferences we had induced. We share
these in the remainder of this paper.
Initial Architectural Choices at ATLAS
The Origins of the ATLAS Collaboration
To appreciate the nature and scope of the challenges
that ATLAS participants confronted, it is important to
understand the genesis of the ATLAS “collaboration”
(as participants called their enterprise). The origins of
ATLAS can be traced to two successful CERN High
Energy Physics (HEP) experiments (UA1 and UA2) in
the early 1980s that led to a Nobel Prize in 1984. Even
as these two experiments were unfolding, groups of sci-
entists had initiated a number of independent research
and development (R&D) initiatives, with each group
exploring a specific technology that potentially could
be used for detecting one or more types of particles in
future HEP experiments. CERN organized several work-
shops in which interested groups shared their progress
with one another. However, at that time, there was no
effort to integrate the various initiatives.
Only when CERN decided to build the LHC did these
groups start “protocollaborations” to integrate their dis-
parate efforts into a joint proposal encompassing all the
detector subsystems (each consisting of various compo-
nents and a complex system in itself) required for a new
particle detector (Knorr-Cetina 1995).9 By 1992, several
such protocollaborations had emerged, each interested in
developing and building a detector for the LHC. As a
result of this decentralized process, there were multiple
technological options for each detector subsystem even
within one protocollaboration and many possible config-
urations of subsystem choices overall.
To rationalize the use of limited resources, CERN
sought a merger of protocollaborations. Two groups,
EAGLE (Experiment for Accurate Gamma, Lepton
and Energy Measurement) and ASCOT (Apparatus
with SuperCOnducting Toroids), came together to form
ATLAS (A Toroidal LHC ApparatuS). The immediate
charge to the newly formed collaboration was to cre-
ate a single new detector architecture. However, ex ante,
there was no inevitability in the architectural choices
for the ATLAS detector system because the collabora-
tors confronted multiple possibilities based on the dif-
ferent approaches and designs that EAGLE and ASCOT
brought to the collaboration.
Making design choices and specifying a suitable
architecture was challenging for various reasons. The
unprecedented levels of energy, radiation, and collision
rates required to discover subatomic particles such as
the Higgs boson (Stapnes 2007) meant that physicists
had to push the frontiers of science and technology.
Consequently, prior detector designs, or even subsys-
tems thereof, could not be reused. Indeed, the detector
would have to be based partly on technologies that had
not yet been developed; scientists could only estimate
the performance of these technologies using sophisti-
cated simulation studies or, where feasible, tests on pro-
totypes of individual components. Moreover, a group’s
preference for or against a specific approach and their
performance estimates relied on assumptions that often
were influenced by their experiences with existing tech-
nologies and therefore potentially not appropriate for the
new approaches being considered. Finally, the sets of
assumptions used by different scientists often diverged
as a result of differences in their epistemic backgrounds
and prior experiences.
These considerations led to ATLAS participants
rejecting preexisting notions of who was and who was
not an expert on a particular topic and challenging one
another to explicate the basis for knowing (in contrast
to what Hardwig 1985 called epistemic dependence).
Alluding to the driving culture of skepticism, a scientist
at CERN noted, “We are a pragmatic community capable
to address in a very material way grand and (apparently)
immaterial questions, knowing that for every answer we
might find, we will open more and unpredicted ques-
tions,” and, consequently, “we definitely prefer to be
Ministers of Doubt than Kings of Truth: ubi dubium, ibi
libertas” (Scientist B).
Complicating matters, the two protocollaborations
EAGLE and ASCOT had already begun working on
different, competing designs. Both protocollaborations
seemed to largely agree on the physics goals and wanted
to jointly build the detector, but each wanted its own
preferred technologies and designs to be adopted. Conse-
quently, many technological decisions such as the choice
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and combinations of detector subsystems, triggers, data
acquisition procedures, simulation programs, and analy-
sis software had to be made.
Several different configurations were possible depend-
ing on specific choices made to accomplish each detector
function, giving rise to considerable complexity. Equally
important, despite sophisticated simulations of various
technological approaches at the component and sub-
system levels, the detector itself could be tested in
situ only after it had been designed, integrated, and
built. In other words, choosing among various tech-
nological approaches and configurations at the initial
stages involved “judgmental” tasks, not “intellective”
ones (Laughlin and Ellis 1986). Not surprisingly, con-
troversies emerged, and resolving them involved a chal-
lenge: the collaboration had to move from competing
detector designs to a common design by sifting through
multiple competing technological options while, at the
same time, not alienating groups whose preferred tech-
nologies were not chosen. This was by no means an easy
task, given the distributed and voluntary nature of the
ATLAS collaboration. It is important to remember that
the participants in this collaboration all were legally and
financially independent physics institutes bound not by
legal contracts but by a nonenforceable memorandum of
understanding. They all brought in manpower from their
home institutions as well as financial resources from
their national funding organizations.
In sum, ATLAS was a collaboration among autono-
mous research institutes coming together “freely” and
on an “equal” basis to reach an “understanding” about
what they would contribute to the common goal (Knorr-
Cetina 1999, p. 164). Consequently, controversies could
not be resolved by a centralized decision-making body
as in a traditional hierarchy. Not only would it be dif-
ficult to enforce such decisions, but such an approach
also could alienate groups whose preferred technologies
were not chosen and potentially reduce their incentive
to cooperate. At an extreme, these groups could even
exit the collaboration and, in the process, take with them
knowledge, manpower, and financial resources critical to
ATLAS’s success.10
Another important reason why centralized decision
making was impractical was that critical knowledge and
intellectual resources were distributed among many par-
ticipants. No individual or group had all the necessary
scientific and technical knowledge to make decisions.
Indeed, many ATLAS scientists whom we interviewed
believed that it was impossible for a centralized group
to make appropriate choices and decisions, because each
required significant effort and deep understanding of the
technological challenges involved.
These two aspects—the importance of consensus
among voluntary participants and the fact that knowl-
edge beyond the expertise of any individual or small
group of experts was required to design and build the
detector—were reflected in the mechanisms employed
for making technology and design choices as well as the
governance of the ATLAS collaboration. Before describ-
ing the process by which choices were agreed upon, we
briefly outline the governance mechanisms that emerged
at ATLAS.
Governance at ATLAS
It is not surprising that ATLAS embraced a collab-
orative form of governance (Adler et al. 2008) that
had emerged over the years based on prior high-energy
physics experiments and protocollaborations at CERN.
Building on these experiences, ATLAS too had adopted
a flat, horizontal structure that established links between
individual (or groups of) participants with common
interests. Activities unfolded within working groups
around specific interests and objects such as detector
subsystems, measurement of specific particles, or soft-
ware code. When interdependencies emerged, a vari-
ety of groups for coordination were set up as needed.
Some of these groups were permanent (e.g., the Exec-
utive Board, which reviewed schedules, milestones, and
use of financial and human resources), whereas other
groups were set up for a limited period of time to handle
specific tasks. The organizational structure that emerged
was pragmatic and flexible, guided by the interests and
tasks relevant to the participants of the collaboration at
any given time and without much central control.
Working groups that investigated potential solutions to
technical challenges constituted the majority of ATLAS
groups. These working groups did not make decisions
on behalf of the collaboration, only recommendations.
Moreover, these working groups were not supervised
by managers or team leaders but were facilitated by
coordinators or conveners whose mandate was to foster
coordination within and across the collaboration’s mul-
tiple groups. Similarly, the ATLAS collaboration itself
did not have a president or corporate-style chief exec-
utive officer; instead, the collaboration had an elected
spokesperson. Having no formal authority over the many
participants (initially 414 and increasing to more than
3,000 as of today) who reported back to their respec-
tive home institutions, the spokesperson represented and
spoke for the collaboration, gently guided attention to
topical issues, and served (on request) as an arbitrator
by facilitating and steering lengthy consultations (among
involved groups and the rest of the participants) toward
acceptable solutions.
Given such decentralized governance that eschewed
an authority-based hierarchy, how did ATLAS partic-
ipants coordinate their activities, and where and how
were decisions made? The main decision- and policy-
making body at ATLAS was the collaboration board,
a democratic venue where each participating research
institute, regardless of its size and contribution to
the collaboration, had one vote. Decisions required a
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two-thirds majority vote, placing a strong emphasis on
generating a consensus that would engender and sustain
cooperation. Even though the collaboration board was
the ultimate formal decision- and policy-making body
at ATLAS, decisions were usually made after a long
deliberative process. This deliberative process involved
the ATLAS Plenary, a forum in which all stakehold-
ers and interested participants within the collaboration
came together to discuss issues, problems, and progress.
Usually, voting in the collaboration board merely for-
malized the consensus that already had emerged from
these discussions. Similarly, although coordinators and
the spokesperson were all elected by the collaboration
board, such elections occurred only “after nomination
of candidates by, and due consultation with, the Col-
laboration” (according to a 1994 ATLAS internal note,
Gen-No-009), further strengthening the collaboration’s
emphasis on consensus in decision making.
To facilitate the involvement of all interested partic-
ipants in seeking solutions and arriving at acceptable
decisions, the collaboration sought to make its inter-
nal workings and deliberations transparent to every-
one. For instance, the studies and recommendations that
emerged from various working groups were continu-
ally exhibited and disseminated to other groups and
the ATLAS collaboration at large in a “grid of dis-
course” (Knorr-Cetina 1999). Besides the many infor-
mal occasions for discourse, there were prearranged
events for formal discourse such as the ATLAS collabo-
ration weeks. During the collaboration weeks, meetings
of many detector subsystem groups and other work-
ing groups were held simultaneously, interspersed with
meetings of the ATLAS Plenary for all-hands discus-
sions concerning physics objectives and study conclu-
sions, hardware and software design, and organizational
matters. The various working groups presented the out-
comes of their meetings and all matters relevant to more
than one detector subsystem to the ATLAS Plenary for
discussion and scrutiny by everyone who was involved
or simply interested. Finally, collaboration board meet-
ings were always scheduled at the very end of each
ATLAS collaboration week, so that “the institute rep-
resentatives [could] participate in all relevant discus-
sions, partake in an emergent consensus, and listen to
the ‘mood of the collaboration”’ (Knorr-Cetina 1999,
p. 184) before voting on important issues that required
consideration from many perspectives.
These real-time occasions for discourse were com-
plemented by asynchronous discourse in the form of a
variety of documents such as meeting minutes, technical
reviews, and design reports as well as extensive commu-
nication through electronic mailing lists, databases, and
Monte Carlo simulations demonstrating a subsystem’s
physics performance that each group made available to
the collaboration at large. Moreover, tools for sharing
(e.g., databases, Web repositories) and representation
(e.g., common simulation software, conventions for anal-
yses) that partly already existed within the wider HEP
community and continued to be augmented as the
ATLAS collaboration progressed facilitated access to
these assets. Because of such transparent access, any
interested participant within ATLAS could contribute to
the exploration and solution of any problem faced by the
collaboration. Furthermore, all pertinent information to
arrive at an informed consensus was available to those
who voted as members of the collaboration board. All
of these, along with the foundation of physics and engi-
neering knowledge and tools possessed by the partici-
pants, constituted a “boundary infrastructure” (Bowker
and Star 1999) for everyone involved.
Coordination Through Justification
In their comprehensive review of coordination in emer-
gent organizations, Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) identi-
fied five key coordination mechanisms—plans and rules,
objects and representations, roles, routines, and proxim-
ity. A mapping of these mechanisms with the situation
at ATLAS provides additional context to the situation
confronted by members of the collaboration during its
inception. Plans and rules were ill-defined because there
was high uncertainty over how to achieve the objective
of discovering new subatomic particles such as the Higgs
boson. The emphasis on transparency, discourse, and
voting to arrive at a consensus offered ground rules and
routines for interaction and decision making. Proximity
was an issue, given that participants were geographically
distributed. However, the use of communication tech-
nologies, comprehensive record keeping, and pervasive
access to such records made it possible for participants
to stay informed of progress. Undergirding all of these
was the boundary infrastructure comprising objects and
representations such as simulations that enabled com-
mon ground among the geographically distributed par-
ticipants hailing from different epistemic communities.
Even though these mechanisms offered a foundation
for emergent coordination, fundamental issues remained
to be addressed in practice. Technological interdepen-
dencies had to be considered even though there was
uncertainty about what constituted relevant and reliable
expertise, i.e., a situation characterized by a lack of
epistemic dependence (Hardwig 1985) among the vari-
ous groups and communities involved (i.e., coordination
challenges). In addition, choices had to be made so that
groups whose preferred technologies were not chosen
would continue to contribute to the collaboration (i.e.,
representing cooperation challenges).
The collaboration’s approach to dealing with these
challenges was to set up review panels—dedicated work-
ing groups set up for limited time frames to coordinate
the development of major subsystems that eventually
could lead to a single detector design. The primary
task of these review panels was to recommend to the
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collaboration at large “which one of the competing tech-
nologies to choose and why” for each subsystem or com-
ponent thereof (Scientist D). Each review panel included
representatives of competing proposals for a particu-
lar detector subsystem or component, “neutral” partic-
ipants working on various other ATLAS subsystems,
and, sometimes, independent scientists from outside the
collaboration.
Underlying the functioning of these review panels
was a core principle that guides ATLAS even today—
that competing technological options “can and should
be analyzed in a scientific (and not emotional) way”
(Scientist F in 1992). The rationale behind this princi-
ple was to allow “matters of concern” (Latour 2004) to
emerge through a rational enlightened discussion based
on “skepticism” (Washington and Cook 2011) by requir-
ing participants to explicate tacitly held beliefs and
causal explanations. As one participant explained, this
would allow “obvious” decisions to emerge instead of an
arbitrary decision being imposed. Not only would this
improve the quality of the decisions but also enhance
their legitimacy.
Scientist C, who participated in many of these review
panels, described the processes that unfolded within the
review panel for the calorimeter subsystem:
The panelists were the judges and there were two parties
against each other. In our case, for the hadronic part [of
the calorimeter], we were against the liquid argon people.
We were looking for problems with their approach and
they were looking for problems with our approach. The
whole thing was relatively formal. We would present our
results and our calculations and they would present their
results and their calculations. And then, we would ask
them nasty questions in writing and they would ask us
nasty questions in writing. There would be answers to
these questions at the next meeting.
We found many examples of such dialectical pro-
cesses and intense scrutiny within all the review panels
we studied. To facilitate these episodes of contesta-
tions and justifications (see also the notion of “trials of
strength” described in Latour 1987, p. 78), proponents
of each technological option were required to make
available all relevant documentation beforehand to allow
for informed discussions throughout the review process.
Based on the presented material, proponents of a partic-
ular technology conducted their own research to develop
a deep understanding of competing technologies so as
to identify their strengths and shortcomings. These were
all articulated in the form of critiques to which each
competitor had to respond, justifying their respective
approaches by offering evidence from simulation studies
and tests of individual component prototypes (where fea-
sible) or by citing support from external experts. These
justifications were explicated in the form of presentation
handouts and reports to be scrutinized by proponents of
competing technologies and review panel members.
As this observation underscores, the cycles of con-
testation and justification unfolding within review pan-
els resulted in an interpenetration of knowledge between
proponents of competing technological approaches for
each subsystem. At the same time, the members of the
review panels also had to penetrate the black box of
technical knowledge to evaluate the arguments being
made (see Latour 2004 for importance of critique) to
act as informed and engaged judges. So reflexive were
these panelists that, in some cases, they even revis-
ited the criteria being used to evaluate competing alter-
natives. For example, the members of the calorimeter
review panel discussed whether or not simulation stud-
ies initially selected as the basis for evaluating the tech-
nologies would be appropriate. As it turned out, the
different groups had based their simulations on many
idiosyncratic assumptions, thereby making it difficult to
conduct meaningful comparisons between the two com-
peting approaches. The panel members concluded that it
would not be prudent to make choices based on these
simulations alone, and they decided to delay recommen-
dations until results from prototypes were available.
It is noteworthy that this dialectical process involved a
much larger audience than just the competing groups and
neutral members within each review panel. Any inter-
ested participant—even one not physically present dur-
ing the reviews—could and did engage. Indeed, many
engaged in the process not only to contribute but also
because the outcomes of these review panels could
impact their own choices. The systemic complexity of
the detector was such that choices pertaining to one
component in one subsystem could easily impact the
choices pertaining to components in another subsystem.
Moreover, some components (such as trigger and align-
ment systems) cut across different subsystems, and cer-
tain technologies (such as gaseous detectors) were used
in components of different subsystems. In such cases,
choices had the potential to impact a number of subsys-
tems that were beyond the purview of a single review
panel and necessitated inputs from multiple affected par-
ticipants and panels.
Recognizing that all relevant participants may not be
physically present at these review panel meetings, all
interactions that were part of the review process were
documented and circulated through electronic mailing
lists and made available to all participants in the col-
laboration on several cross-linked websites. Because of
this transparency and engagement, a scientist who was
not formally a member of the review panel sent the fol-
lowing email correspondence to the muon spectrometer
review panel members in 1993:
I see the following line of reasoning which might have
led to this conclusion: (A) For ANY muon trigger
scheme, the partitioning in the second coordinate must
be of the order of a few centimeters in order for the trig-
ger not to be swamped by background. → The trigger-
detector will necessarily measure the second coordinate
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with a resolution of a few centimeters. (B) It seems virtu-
ally impossible to derive a proper muon trigger from any
of the ATLAS precision detector options. → A separate,
stand-alone trigger detector is required! (C) Combination
of (A) and (B) then seems to lead to the conclusion that
the stand-alone trigger device has to measure the second
coordinate anyway and hence that no second coordinate
is needed from the precision detector.
I fully support the conclusions under (A) and (B). I do
however argue that the apparently very logical conclu-
sion 4C5 is not well considered and unjustified. It has
a number of less favorable consequences which I would
like to point out to the panel. (emphasis added)
This example shows how transparency and easy access
to review panel proceedings allowed even individuals
who were not formally a part of the review panel to pen-
etrate the technology black boxes to offer valuable new
arguments and bring insights to the attention of review
panel members. Reflecting on the process, a senior sci-
entist explained the importance of the overall dialec-
tic process and the value of exposing arguments to the
scrutiny of both review panel members and the ATLAS
collaboration at large:
Very sensible questions were asked, and the more this
process rolled on, the more facets were discovered which
initially had not even been taken into account. 0 0 0Many
things came up which had not been thought of before.
This process was scientifically very valuable but also very
costly. But if you ask me whether I would endorse such a
situation, I do it absolutely. Because the alternative is that
you just knock on the table and take a decision. But then
you have not thought about everything, not to the same
extent to which such a detailed, very painful scientific
evaluation process leads you. This is a big advantage.
(Scientist D)
The value of such contributions became even more
apparent as a specific technology’s role in the function-
ing of the overall detector and the latent interdependen-
cies with other components could only be understood
through interactions with those working on other com-
ponents and subsystems. On these occasions, the coor-
dination process required expertise on interdependent
subsystems in addition to knowledge of specific sub-
systems under review. Scientist O, who was a scientist
involved in the calorimeter review panel, explained, for
example, how the choice of a specific technology for
the inner detector subsystem (recommended by a dif-
ferent review panel) resulted in the use of more mate-
rial than anticipated by the calorimeter group, thereby
potentially introducing errors into the calorimeter mea-
surements. Specifically, particle showers caused by this
excess material would result in biased energy measure-
ments in the calorimeter. To account for this error,
some calorimeter scientists proposed a new approach to
calorimeter design that enabled the detection of parti-
cle showers before they entered the calorimeter, thereby
controlling for the measurement bias. Interestingly,
this search for latent interdependencies often was
driven by some groups seeking to demonstrate that
their proposed approach worked better with approaches
being considered for other subsystems than competing
approaches.
Through this constant unraveling of different techno-
logical features, proponents of a particular technological
approach explored, to the extent possible, the potential
performance and interactions with other detector subsys-
tems. By engaging in these cycles of contestation and
justification, they attempted to convince others in the
collaboration that their approach was the most appro-
priate, given the other choices being explored for the
ATLAS detector. The long time frames (several review
panels explored alternative options for one to two years
before making a recommendation) allowed competing
groups to mull the steady stream of feedback and even-
tually come to terms with some alternatives being “more
appropriate” than others for the detector design. Over
time, after intense scrutiny and deliberations within the
review panels and other forums such as the ATLAS Ple-
nary, some technologies became acceptable to a major-
ity, including those who had no intrinsic stake in the
technology (Knorr-Cetina 1999, p. 198). Indeed, as a
senior scientist noted, “When decision making was an
item on the agenda [of the collaboration board], this
often meant that something which was already agreed
upon and clear for everyone in the collaboration was
made plausible and formally approved” (Scientist F).
In sum, the review panels fostered explication
through justification and sought to minimize the dys-
functional aspects of politics in the evaluation and
decision-making process. This process contrasts with
processes found in committee-based decision-making
bodies such as standard-setting organizations that often-
times involve unproductive haggling and coalition for-
mation (Genschel 1997, Rosenkopf et al. 2001). The
constructive confrontation between participants, which
were both public and transparent, made it possible to
incrementally develop solutions that built on all offered
arguments and thus became acceptable to all the groups
involved. Indeed, the legitimacy of the choices among
competing alternatives was established as these choices
were seen to emerge naturally from deliberations.
Equally important, the interpenetration of knowledge
between competing groups enabled scientists and engi-
neers who already possessed specialized knowledge of
their own technologies to also develop expertise in alter-
native technologies, both for their own subsystems and
interdependent detector subsystems. Such interpenetra-
tion of knowledge occurred not only among participants
associated directly with the review panels and other
working groups but also across the entire collaboration
as interested participants from interdependent subsys-
tems got involved in the process. In addition, the out-
come of the cycles of contestation and justification was
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not merely knowledge transfer. Rather, when competing
groups and those working on interdependent subsys-
tems tried to understand the what, how, and why of the
various options, they also were able to recontextualize
and transform that knowledge to improve or even rad-
ically alter their own designs. Such recontextualization
and transformation led to the emergence of new options
beyond those that were initially proposed for scrutiny
by the review panels (see Starbuck 1983 for a notion of
design as one that opens up new options).
Emergent Coordination
Over a period of two years, the resolution of early
controversies in the ATLAS review panels resulted in
choices made among competing alternatives for vari-
ous subsystems. In late 1994, participants then agreed
on preliminary interface specifications among the major
detector subsystems, leading to a pragmatic decomposi-
tion (Simon 1962) of the detector so that different com-
munities could work separately and in parallel on their
respective subsystems.
All participants realized that they were agreeing on
these provisional interface specifications for pragmatic
reasons and that gaps in their knowledge even at that
stage could lead to glitches (Hoopes and Postrel 1999)
as their work progressed, which would in turn require
adjustments to the specifications.11 Sure enough, a tech-
nological challenge emerged around the large supercon-
ducting magnet, a component that interacts with several
ATLAS subsystems. We describe this in some detail,
because it shows how the collaboration functioned. The
magnet, initially designed with 12 coils and an inner
bore of 10 meters, also set the spatial parameters for
the other subsystems. However, over time, the collabora-
tion realized that the costs and risks associated with the
deployment of the 12-coil magnet would be far greater
than anticipated earlier. Consequently, a Magnet Work-
ing Group consisting of magnet experts and participants
from different detector subsystems was formed to exam-
ine this issue. After thorough deliberation, the group rec-
ommended a superconducting magnet with eight coils
and an inner bore of only 9.4 meters, which would
reduce the costs and risks associated with the magnet
and the muon spectrometer subsystem.
However, these new specifications affected other sub-
systems by leaving only 90% of the originally available
space for other detector subsystems inside the magnet.
For instance, the space originally kept aside for inner
detector electronics was now no longer available. Gener-
ating space for these electronics implied compromising
the space available for the components of the calorimeter
and the muon spectrometer subsystems.
Given the systemic nature of this problem, ATLAS
then formed the Global Descoping Task Force to find a
solution. All three major subsystem communities were
represented in this task force, whose members were
charged “with taking a global perspective rather than
acting as a representative for their subsystem” (Ellis
et al. 1995, p. 2). Details of the task force meetings
were distributed to the collaboration at large to solicit
comments, which were distributed to all members of
the collaboration. Eventually, after in-depth investiga-
tions and intense deliberations, the task force arrived at
an acceptable solution. Specifically, gaps would be intro-
duced between the calorimeter and the muon spectrom-
eter subsystems to generate space for additional cables
and cooling pipes required for the inner detector subsys-
tem. In the process, the muon spectrometer subsystem
was redesigned to give up some space to host the inner
detector electronics.
However, this was not the end of the episode. The
resolution of the original problem of constrained phys-
ical space introduced a new interdependence in terms
of electromagnetic fields. The cables installed to con-
nect the electronics with the inner detector subsystem
began picking up signal noise due to the magnetic
fields generated when they passed close to power sup-
plies. To account for this interdependence, the task force
implemented new effective shielding to protect these
cables from picking up signal noise. The shielding, in
turn, introduced additional materials, generating particle
interactions that had to be minimized to reduce distur-
bance to the calorimeter, creating yet another issue for
consideration.
As these observations illustrate, the ATLAS collab-
oration encountered latent interdependencies that had
not been anticipated when the system was pragmati-
cally decomposed. However, each time the collabora-
tion encountered these interdependencies, a fresh cycle
of arguments and justification would ensue within con-
cerned forums. To generate solutions that were optimal
both locally (at the subsystem level) and globally (at
the overall detector level), especially given pragmatic
decomposition of the detector architecture, the conven-
ers of these forums made the deliberations as trans-
parent and accessible as those during the early review
panels. Accordingly, the different groups presented the
new challenges they confronted, the problems that they
anticipated, as well as the progress they had made
at periodically held plenary meetings. These all-hands
conversations played an important role in focusing the
attention of all participants and in helping communities
working on interdependent subsystems to synchronize
their work and track the changes taking place across the
ATLAS collaboration.
All of this resulted in further interpenetration of
knowledge among communities working on different
subsystems, as they had to consider not only the
functioning of their own subsystems but also potential
interactions with other subsystems and the performance
of the overall ATLAS detector. Such interpenetration of
knowledge also had another beneficial effect—that of
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utilizing knowledge already gained elsewhere within the
collaboration to solve emergent problems. As a senior
scientist pointed out, at each point in the journey, knowl-
edge generated during the many reviews turned out to
be “answers to some other problem encountered later in
some other context” (Scientist S).
An example will help illustrate this point. A task force
investigating the cooling system for the inner detector
subsystem identified potential risks in using binary ice as
a coolant.12 Inner detector engineers had not perceived
this risk earlier because they had focused only on the
superior cooling performance of binary ice in extract-
ing heat from the densely packed inner detector subsys-
tem. However, because of knowledge overlaps that had
emerged, scientists working on other detector subsys-
tems were able to draw attention to the negative impact
of binary ice on the performance of their own subsys-
tems. This concern sensitized the task force to the risks
associated with binary ice (such as water leakages) and
prompted it to propose an evaporative cooling system
instead. The resolution of this controversy resulted in a
design that not only used less material but also mini-
mized the risk of water leakage within the inner detector
subsystem. In other words, because of the interpenetra-
tion of knowledge, scientists working on interdependent
subsystems were able to utilize the knowledge that had
emerged during prior reviews and deliberations to iden-
tify robust solutions to unforeseen problems at a later
time. Indeed, in some instances, without such interpene-
tration of knowledge, problems may not have been iden-
tified until it was too late.
Further Exploration of Justification and
Knowledge Structures
Our inductive analysis of the data revealed that jus-
tification driven by contestation resulted in overlaps
of knowledge within and across different subsystem
communities at ATLAS. To explore this further, we ana-
lyzed the role of justification within ATLAS and the
knowledge structures that emerged as a consequence.
To this end, we took advantage of an opportunity to
conduct a natural experiment—i.e., to compare the jus-
tification processes within key review panels and asso-
ciated subsystem communities (a situation of embedded
case study; see Yin 1994). Specifically, there was one
subsystem community (i.e., the muon spectrometer com-
munity) in which the level of scrutiny, justification,
and transparency was significantly lower during the
early design phase compared to that of others (i.e., the
calorimeter and the inner detector communities).13 We
used this discrepancy to explore whether the different
levels of justification influenced the levels of interlaced
knowledge that emerged within these communities.
Although the muon spectrometer review panel also
held meetings and shared information much like the
other review panels during the early design phase, the
nature of the discourse that unfolded during panel pro-
ceedings was less reflective and less critical than the oth-
ers. For instance, whereas other review panels circulated
technical details beforehand and allocated most of their
time for critical discussions of competing proposals, the
muon spectrometer panel merely listened to presenta-
tions of competing designs and received them without
any systematic questioning or scrutiny. These interac-
tions did not correspond with the norms of justification
driven by contestation. Questions, when raised, did not
seek explanations of underlying assumptions and ratio-
nales. Responses often were taken for granted, and when
questions resurfaced in subsequent meetings, questioners
were summarily referred to the original responses that
could be found in the documentation of earlier meetings
(instead of revisiting and scrutinizing the issues care-
fully). Any scrutiny of consequence came from ATLAS
participants who were not formally part of the muon
spectrometer review panel. For these reasons, the muon
spectrometer review panel was perceived by the collab-
oration at large (and even by community insiders) to
be less transparent than a typical ATLAS review panel
(and other working groups). Indeed, after the first few
review meetings, the ATLAS spokesperson expressed
concern about the lack of scrutiny and discourse within
this review panel:
A Panel should not work in isolation but rather in close
contact with the collaboration. As most of the people
do not know what happens in the Muon Panel they
have a right to know 0 0 0 0 Otherwise we will have panic
about recommendations being suddenly made and thrown
onto the collaboration, without them having a chance
of following and appreciating the deliberation process.
(ATLAS spokesperson in a 1993 email correspondence)
Despite these concerns, the review panel’s process
did not change. Indeed, the panel did not even make
much effort to justify its final recommendation, even
though many thought that important issues had not
been explored thoroughly. The groups that had lost out
(i.e., proposed alternatives to the technology eventually
recommended for acceptance by the panel) responded
by leading a revolt. One individual involved wrote
a formal complaint to the muon spectrometer review
panel noting that the “way of justifying—or rather not
justifying—was unacceptable” (email correspondence
dated 1993). Speaking to legitimacy and cooperation
concerns, another influential person within the muon
spectrometer community wrote in a 1993 email,
I firmly believe that after many man-years of hard and
dedicated work the proponents of all technologies, but
especially the losing ones, are entitled to at least one
line of comment as to what are, in the eyes of the panel
members, their flaws or weaknesses in comparison to the
competitors.
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As evident from these reactions, it was not the recom-
mendation of or against a specific technology that caused
the muon spectrometer review panel to fall short in the
eyes of the collaboration. Rather, critics of the review
panel were concerned that the lack of scrutiny and trans-
parency made it impossible for other participants of
the collaboration to judge from their own perspectives
whether the recommendation was based on good scien-
tific reasons and appropriate, both from local (i.e., the
specific subsystem) and global (i.e., overall ATLAS) per-
spectives. Upon further scrutiny after the revolt, it turned
out that the technology recommended by the muon spec-
trometer review panel was marginally superior to com-
peting approaches on paper, but critical problems (e.g.,
risks associated with production and installation toler-
ances) were not taken into account even though scientists
working on competing proposals were aware of them
and attempted to address them in their own proposals.
The protests and revolt eventually led to the rejec-
tion of the panel’s recommendation14 followed by sig-
nificant changes in the processes employed by the muon
spectrometer review panel. Additional workshops were
organized to discuss the competing proposals and any
outstanding arguments. According to review participants
and the wider muon spectrometer community, the trans-
parency and intensity with which the muon spectrometer
panel engaged in scrutiny and justification increased sub-
stantially after the revolt. The eventual outcome was a
recommendation that was perceived as being legitimate
and, hence, acceptable to all.
Justification and Emergent Knowledge Structures
We conducted additional analysis on the extent to which
ATLAS subsystem communities engaged in justification
as the project unfolded and also to explore the knowl-
edge structures that emerged as a consequence. To better
understand the role that justification played in this pro-
cess, we compared the muon spectrometer community,
which did not sufficiently engage in justification in the
early phase, with the calorimeter community, often held
up as the role model within ATLAS.
To do so, we first identified the levels of justification
during different phases of development for the calorime-
ter and muon spectrometer subsystem communities using
computer linguistic analysis. Second, we analyzed the
knowledge structures that emerged for each of these sub-
system communities by generating bipartite networks
consisting of the individuals involved (several hundred
physicists and engineers spread across different research
institutes and countries) and their areas of expertise. We
then examined the relationship between justification and
the knowledge structures over time and between the dif-
ferent subsystem communities by comparing the results
of the prior two steps. Finally, we analyzed data on
project progress made by these different subsystem com-
munities to explore how the differences in justification
and consequent knowledge structures were related to dif-
ferences in project progress. Next, we describe these
steps and the outcomes of our analysis.
Justification. Our approach to identifying differ-
ent justification levels among subsystem communities
involved conducting a computer linguistic analysis of
the ATLAS documents generated in the review panels
and other forums pertaining to each subsystem. As we
stated earlier, all the proceedings of the various work-
ing groups, review panels, and task forces were docu-
mented at ATLAS. These texts were important because
they (a) provided transparency to the process, (b) could
easily circulate among participants of the collaboration
so that even those who were not present at the meet-
ings could get involved or scrutinize the rationale for a
decision, and (c) generated a memory of how and why
a certain recommendation was made. Thus, analyzing
these considerable data offered a way for us to probe
the levels of justification that had unfolded within these
forums.
Altogether, we had access to 2,419 documents gener-
ated by ATLAS scientists between 1992 and 2007. Each
document was time-stamped and attributable to specific
ATLAS subsystems, enabling us to explore differences
in justification levels over time within each subsystem
community. As a proxy, we identified terms such as
“because,” “since,” “therefore,” and “due to” in the text
as indicators of justifications offered by authors. We
used latent semantic analysis (Deerwester et al. 1990),
a natural language processing approach, to measure the
importance of these words in the documents pertaining
to each subsystem community. An advantage of latent
semantic analysis is its ability to overcome the problems
that emerge because of synonymy and polysemy,15 a fea-
ture that made it possible for us to capture the semantic
network of concepts around justification within a docu-
ment rather than conduct a simple word count (Landauer
et al. 1998).
Figure 2 shows the justification factors for the
calorimeter and muon spectrometer communities during
different phases of development. The justification fac-
tor for a specific subsystem community was the mean
value of cosine similarity (Deerwester et al. 1990) of
the search vector for justification-related terms (e.g.,
“because,” “since,” “therefore,” “due to”) and all docu-
ments generated by that specific subsystem community,
indicating the extent to which that community engaged
in justification. As evident from Figure 2, the level of
justification was high within the calorimeter subsys-
tem community during the early design phase, and it
even increased marginally during detailed development
of the subsystem. By contrast, the level of justification
in the muon spectrometer community was low initially
but increased after the revolt and reached its highest
level during detailed development between 1996 and
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1998. Overall, the pattern in this figure is consistent
with our earlier qualitative description of the justifica-
tion processes as perceived within these two subsystem
communities.
Knowledge Structures. We also analyzed the biblio-
graphic records of the 2,419 documents to understand
and depict the knowledge structures that had emerged
within the calorimeter and muon spectrometer communi-
ties. Specifically, we identified each participant’s areas of
expertise by analyzing the topics appearing in the titles,
keywords, and abstracts of the documents he or she had
coauthored. We used latent semantic analysis to account
for terms that were used synonymously to depict an
area of expertise. Based on these bibliographic records,
we generated a bipartite network (see Appendix C) of
all participants belonging to a specific subsystem com-
munity (several hundred people in each case) and their
respective areas of expertise relevant to any ATLAS
technology, whether related to their own subsystem or
to the others.
From these data, we created a unipartite projection
of the knowledge structures of the different subsystem
communities and analyzed knowledge across ATLAS
subsystems using density16 as a network measure (see
Figure 3). Density represents the ratio of connections
between all nodes of a network to the number of con-
nections that are theoretically possible (Mitchell 1969).
A subsystem community with a knowledge structure
connecting many diverse areas of expertise, both within
and across subsystems, will have a higher density than a
community with knowledge structures connecting fewer
areas of expertise (e.g., focused on their own subsystem).
A visual comparison of the knowledge structures dur-
ing the early design phase in Figure 3 (left panel)
shows that the knowledge structure held by members
of the calorimeter subsystem community had a higher

















Node centrality: low high
Edge weight: low high
Notes. The nodes in the networks represent the 456 specialized
domains of knowledge involved in the development of the ATLAS
detector. The color code indicates the centrality of a particular
knowledge domain in a subsystem community (red indicating high-
est centrality). The edges connecting the nodes indicate over-
laps between knowledge domains, i.e., ATLAS scientists working
in that subsystem community having specialized knowledge in two
or more domains (yellow edges indicating weak and green edges
indicating strong connections). As this figure shows, during the
early design period (around 1994), the calorimeter community had
a more interlaced knowledge structure than the muon spectrom-
eter community, connecting knowledge assets relevant to its own
subsystem as well as knowledge assets relevant to others. This dif-
ference between the two communities is less apparent toward the
end of the development of the ATLAS detector (around 1998).
density than the knowledge structure held by the muon
spectrometer subsystem community. Figure 3 also shows
that the density of the knowledge structures increased
for both communities (right panel). This same pat-
tern is observed in Figure 4, a plot showing the den-
sity of the knowledge structures of the two subsystem
communities during the early design and the later devel-
opment phases. In other words, the number of connec-
tions between diverse areas of expertise increased, as did
connection strength.
A juxtaposition of Figure 2 with Figure 4 suggests a
relationship between justification and knowledge struc-
tures. For each subsystem, the density of the knowledge
structure (Figure 4) parallels the levels of justification
(Figure 2). Moreover, for both subsystem communi-
ties, knowledge structure density is commensurate with
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the respective levels of justification (or lack thereof).
Although we cannot ascribe causality from such a com-
parison, our qualitative and contextualized analysis sug-
gests such an inference. Specifically, as we described
earlier, the competing choices for the calorimeter sub-
system were heavily scrutinized and debated, frequently
involving contributions from members of other subsys-
tem communities. The final recommendation was made
after a high level of justification during the early design
phase, thereby generating for the calorimeter community
a knowledge structure that densely connected knowledge
of calorimeter technology with knowledge of interdepen-
dent subsystems.
In contrast, the muon spectrometer community did not
carry out such intense scrutiny during the early design
phase, and justification played only a minor role in the
process until after the revolt. Consistent with this con-
text, the knowledge structure that emerged within that
community was sparse and more focused on the tech-
nology associated with its own subsystem compared to
the calorimeter community. However, by the later devel-
opment phase, the muon spectrometer community also
had developed a justification level similar to that of
the calorimeter community, and its knowledge structure
also became densely connected, including knowledge of
other subsystems.
From this analysis, we inferred that justifications
(disseminated widely and transparently) had played an
important role in the emergence of the ATLAS archi-
tecture by generating a knowledge structure with essen-
tial points of overlap or interpenetration within and
across communities working on different subsystems.
Furthermore, as we had qualitatively discussed earlier,
not only was the knowledge structure the outcome of
the justification processes involved, but it also served
as a medium for coordination, enabling interdepen-
dent groups to identify emerging problems and develop
solutions as the project unfolded. From this perspective,
it was not surprising to see a contrast between the com-
munities working on the calorimeter and the muon spec-
trometer subsystems in terms of technical problems and
project delays.
Indeed, further analysis of the ATLAS Project
Progress Tracking database showed that the calorime-
ter subsystem community had performed the task of
developing and constructing their subsystem more effec-
tively. Whereas 9% of all design-related tasks of the
calorimeter community were delayed because of unex-
pected technical problems, the muon spectrometer com-
munity was challenged by unanticipated problems in
14% of all design-related tasks. This difference was even
more striking when we compared the mean delay of
design tasks undertaken by either subsystem community.
The average delay of muon spectrometer-related design
tasks (6.7 months) was more than double the average
delay of calorimeter-related design tasks (2.7 months).
In other words, the differences in knowledge structure
appear to be reflected in the incidence and severity of
glitches (Hoopes and Postrel 1999) encountered by the
two communities as their respective work progressed.
Discussion
We began this paper by asking how actors with diverse
epistemic backgrounds were able to collaborate to
design a radically new and complex technological sys-
tem when there were significant uncertainties about
underlying technologies and a taken-for-granted archi-
tecture did not exist that enabled embedded coordina-
tion. As we reported, there was insufficient predictive
knowledge (Puranam et al. 2012) to facilitate coordina-
tion, given the novel technologies under consideration
and the resultant uncertainties. In addition, epistemic
differences across the subsystem communities (Knorr-
Cetina 1999) made it difficult for the collaboration at
large to evaluate and agree on choices, especially with
different groups offering what they thought were the best
options for any specific part of the system. Indeed, it
was not possible to demonstrate conclusively (through
simulations, experiments, or prototypes) whether the
system would work well when components and subsys-
tems were integrated as proposed. In other words, the
possibility of glitches (Hoopes and Postrel 1999) was
high with potentially disastrous consequences in terms
of additional effort and funds required to fix them, the
attendant time delays, and a tarnished reputation of the
scientific enterprise.17
There did exist a boundary infrastructure offering a
common ground (Srikanth and Puranam 2011) cover-
ing foundations of high energy physics and collabora-
tion in large experiments (e.g., importance of consensus,
transparency, voting rules). However, this alone was not
sufficient to address the challenges that the new system
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in the making posed, because there had never been a
physics collaboration of comparable scale and techno-
logical complexity before.
For all of these reasons, the collaborative community
confronted a judgmental task in cocreating a common
architecture. Accordingly, the collaborators had to go
beyond the typical coordination mechanisms proposed
for multiparty development of complex technological
systems, such as technical committees, task forces, or
standards bodies (Farrell and Saloner 1988, Hobday
1998, Rosenkopf and Tushman 1998). In particular,
knowledge integration issues were a challenge, given the
diverse epistemic backgrounds of interdependent groups.
Especially troublesome was the inability to rely on exist-
ing knowledge and expertise (what Hardwig 1985 called
epistemic dependence), given that the contours of the
architecture, and therefore the nature of problems to
be addressed, were not known. Participants realized the
potential for unproductive conflict that could adversely
impact incentives to cooperate if decision making was
politicized. Specifically, groups that had volunteered
their expertise and technologies to the collaboration
could simply decide to withdraw the resources they had
brought with them and exit the collaboration, or they
could stay in the collaboration but not contribute their
best efforts if their offerings were summarily ruled out
without careful discussion and evaluation.
So how did participants at ATLAS address these
challenges, especially those pertaining to knowledge
integration? Our study highlights (a) the importance of
justification that led to (b) the emergence of an inter-
laced knowledge structure that reduced the potential for
and severity of glitches, facilitated emergent coordina-
tion, and enabled (c) pragmatic decomposition of the
complex system. We explicate these insights below.
Justification
Our study of ATLAS revealed justification as an under-
explored yet key coordination mechanism when interde-
pendent groups work on the architectural choices and
the design of complex systems. We identified this mech-
anism not as a substitute but as a complement to coor-
dination mechanisms identified in extant literature. For
instance, ATLAS had ongoing interactions among par-
ticipants within task forces, committees, collaboration
board meetings, and ATLAS Weeks. Discussions within
these forums covered a wide range of topics including
the progress that had been made and the bottlenecks
that actors had encountered or anticipated. Indeed, these
forums can be likened to committees and other collec-
tive forums (see also Rosenkopf et al. 2001, Simcoe
2012) that offer interdependent actors opportunities to
coordinate their activities by sharing knowledge on who
is doing what and when (i.e., schedules and choices).
In addition, these forums also served as venues for the
exchange of general domain knowledge such as results
of experiments and simulations.
In an earlier study of a high-energy physics commu-
nity at CERN, Knorr-Cetina (1999) also documented
the presence of such forums and noted that they foster
a “grid of discourse.” As she noted, “Discourse chan-
nels individual knowledge into the experiment, provid-
ing it with a sort of distributed cognition or a stream of
(collective) self-knowledge, which flows from the aston-
ishingly intricate webs of communication pathways”
(Knorr-Cetina 1999, p. 173). At ATLAS, the grid of
discourse was such that it was completely transparent
to all participants. Such transparent access to these dis-
courses generated a situation similar to what has been
called “actionable transparency” (Colfer and Baldwin
2010, Zuboff 1988).
The boundary infrastructure that emerged as a result
of this grid of discourse enabled participants to arrive at
coordinated inferences (Bowker and Star 1999) as they
“co-oriented” (Taylor and Van Every 2000) themselves
while negotiating the design. Boundary objects (Star and
Griesemer 1989) are key elements of this infrastructure.
At ATLAS, these boundary objects included templates
for presentations, conventions for presenting physics
results using plots, elaborate frameworks for producing
Monte Carlo simulations as well as the results created
by such simulations, and PERT/CPM charts reporting
progress. These may appear mundane, but such stan-
dardization helped actors coordinate their activities effi-
ciently and effectively. For example, the Monte Carlo
simulations of physics results made it possible for par-
ticipants to grasp the potential performance of individ-
ual components and subsystems and thereby coordinate
their activities. By using and exchanging such boundary
objects, scientists from different backgrounds enacted a
“trading zone,” which allowed them to coordinate tac-
itly across disciplinary boundaries even if they disagreed
on the meaning and the significance of these objects
(Galison 1997, Kellogg et al. 2006).
What we found interesting, however, was that par-
ticipants did not use this boundary infrastructure to
engender only tacit coordination (Srikanth and Puranam
2011). Instead, participants also used it as a fabric to
voice concerns or contest one another’s claims so that
underlying tacit assumptions and beliefs were explicated
in the process of making co-oriented choices. These
observations are consistent with the findings of science
and technology study scholars such as Callon (1995,
p. 55), who noted that a whole “invisible infrastructure”
is required to spawn meaningful discussion and debate
among interdependent actors. Specifically, Callon (1995,
p. 55) observed that even the “all controversies, even the
most fierce and relentless, depend upon a tacit agree-
ment about what is important and what is not.” In other
words, as we observed at ATLAS, the boundary infras-
tructure can also serve as the catalyst for explication
through cycles of contestation and justification.
Tuertscher, Garud, and Kumaraswamy: Justification and Interlaced Knowledge at ATLAS, CERN
Organization Science 25(6), pp. 1579–1608, © 2014 INFORMS 1597
This boundary infrastructure allowed competing
groups of participants to discuss and debate differ-
ences among alternatives within review panels. At these
panels, many different points of view and subsystem-
specific perspectives were articulated within an overall
process characterized by others as “contests of unfold-
ing” (Knorr-Cetina 1999, p. 196) and “trials of strength”
(Latour 1987, p. 78). To engage in such contests, groups
had to generate a deep understanding of their own and
others’ technologies (i.e., open up the modularity black
boxes) before they could scrutinize competing propos-
als for their own as well as for interdependent sub-
systems. In turn, when challenged, they had to present
arguments to justify their own proposals (Green 2004,
Toulmin 1983). Indeed, even the perspectives, questions,
and justifications (whether in support of or against) of
groups working on other subsystems than the one under
review were considered. Because of these dialectical
processes, knowledge was not just exchanged or trans-
ferred. As participants explicated their beliefs and under-
lying assumptions to justify their respective preferences,
they and others were able to create new knowledge
(Nonaka and von Krogh 2009). In other words, a new
synthesis emerged when issues were debated from dif-
ferent vantage points.
These processes led to co-oriented decisions that
wound their way through the ATLAS organization to
be ratified eventually by the collaboration board. The
whole process is analogous to collective induction, “an
orderly social combination process of resolution of dis-
agreements by voting, turn taking, demonstration, and
formation of emergent hypotheses, rather than any of
these four processes alone” (Laughlin and Hollingshead
1995, p. 94). In addition to coordinating technical deci-
sions across interdependent subsystem communities, this
process ensured that groups would not lose their moti-
vation to continue cooperating, even if their respective
technologies were not chosen. The outcome was a detec-
tor architecture that had both technical integrity and
legitimacy.
The Emergence of Interlaced Knowledge
As we noted, the dialectical process of inquiry at ATLAS
not only served as a mechanism for engaged coordina-
tion but also enhanced the boundary infrastructure that
all participants could access. At the same time, expli-
cation through justification also enhanced the knowl-
edge of the groups that confronted one another within
review panels and, as a result, deepened specialized
pockets of expertise on each component and subsystem
within ATLAS. As panel members and other interested
participants working on interdependent subsystems also
scrutinized the competing proposals, members of the
ATLAS community not only deepened an understand-
ing of their own subsystems but also gained a deeper
understanding of other interdependent subsystems. Such
interpenetration of knowledge across communities was
not centrally orchestrated but occurred in an emer-
gent fashion driven by members’ appreciation of crit-
ical interdependencies based on their own experiences
and the interactional expertise (Collins and Evans 2007)
that emerged. As many participants interacted with one
another in a variety of different forums, knowledge over-
laps occurred across different dyads in an idiosyncratic
yet redundant way.
Figure 5 offers a stylized representation of the knowl-
edge structure that emerged. In Figure 5, the circle at
the base represents the boundary infrastructure on which
ATLAS operates. Built on that common substrate are
intersecting circles representing the knowledge domains
of members of three different communities, A, B, and C.
Each community has multiple members (A1, A2, etc.)
who possess specialized knowledge that is comprehen-
sible to other members of that community. A2 and B1
may share some knowledge asset, K6, such as a par-
ticular sensor that can be used by both communities.
B2 and C2 have their own pocket of shared knowledge,
K11. But K11 is not shared with members of Commu-
nity A, and K6 is not shared with members of Com-
munity C. The various intersections of the knowledge
domains represent interlacing of knowledge within and
across communities.
We use the term interlaced knowledge to refer to the
knowledge structure represented by the distributed over-
laps (K6, K7, K9, K11, etc.) considered together. In its
structure and distributed nature, interlaced knowledge
moves the level of analysis from dyads (Hoopes and
Postrel 1999, Postrel 2002, Srikanth and Puranam 2011)
to the level of the entire system; that is, no one knows
everything, but the whole is constituted from the parts
because of the interwoven pockets of shared knowledge
among participants.
As interested participants who are concerned about
specific aspects of another subsystem open up the black
box through contestation and justification, they cre-
ate targeted and redundant partial overlaps of knowl-
edge across subsystem communities. At the same time,
each participant’s expertise remains intact (and per-
haps is even deepened because of the cycles of con-
testation and justification) so that the specialization
required to make appropriate design choices for spe-
cific detector subsystems and the components thereof is
maintained.
Such productive redundancy enables what Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995, p. 14) labeled a “shared division of
labor” (see also Garud and Kotha 1994, Morgan 1986).
In this sense, it is different from the notion of trans-
specialist understanding discussed by Postrel (2002),
wherein actors become generalists incapable of solving
intricate problems requiring specialized knowledge, but
play a role in integrating knowledge across different spe-
cialist domains. In ATLAS, the integration was accom-
plished by the specialists themselves, each crossing a
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Figure 5 Interlaced Knowledge and Boundary Infrastructure
(a) Scientists from different communities connecting various knowledge domains
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A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2
Notes. The bipartite graph in panel (a) shows scientists from different subsystem communities who have expertise in various knowledge
domains. Moreover, these scientists all share a common boundary infrastructure. The circle at the base of panel (b) represents the boundary
infrastructure on which ATLAS operates. Built on that common substrate are intersecting circles representing the knowledge domains of
members of three different communities A, B, and C. Each community has multiple members (A1, A2, etc.) who possess specialized
knowledge that is easily comprehensible to other members of that community. A2 and B1 may share some knowledge asset (such as a
particular sensor that can be used by both communities), K6. B2 and C2 have their own pocket of shared knowledge, K11. But K11 is not
shared with members of community A, and K6 is not shared with members of community C. The various intersections of the knowledge
domains represent interlacing of knowledge within and across communities.
few epistemic boundaries in a multiplexed way. Because
not everyone need generate a deep understanding of all
parts of the detector, it rationalizes the costs of cross-
ing epistemic boundaries (for more on escalating costs
of knowledge integration across multiple epistemic com-
munities, see Berends et al. 2011, Grant 1996a). And
the network of connections across the people and arti-
facts across the entire collaboration creates a pathway
for access to diverse expertise on demand. All of this is
supported by the common substrate of knowledge, i.e.,
the boundary infrastructure that constitutes the lingua
franca of the emergent detector system.
Dynamics of Coordination Over Time
Figure 6 summarizes our process model. As we dis-
cussed earlier, coordination was accomplished through
several mechanisms, especially cycles of contestation
and justification that led to the emergence of interlaced
knowledge. Interlacing of knowledge, in turn, enabled
the pragmatic decomposition of the ATLAS detector
so that parallel and distributed development of various
subsystems could occur. Participants, however, realized
that any such decomposition could only be provisional
and would need to be revisited as development pro-
ceeded. Unlike systems where some components are
more important than others and occupy the apex of the
system hierarchy, in the ATLAS case, many compo-
nents were equally important. Consequently, it was not
possible for the collaborators to wait for components
at the apex of the hierarchy to crystallize before set-
ting the parameters for the emergence of components
lower in the system hierarchy (Clark 1985, Tushman and
Murmann 1998, Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992). Instead,
given the uncertainties and complexities, latent interde-
pendencies only surfaced as system development and
integration unfolded (Barry and Rerup 2006, Garud and
Munir 2008, Staudenmayer et al. 2005).
Realizing the possibility of latent interdependen-
cies emerging with further development, participants
at ATLAS continued to maintain rich communications
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and interactions within and across subsystem boundaries
even after they had pragmatically decomposed the sys-
tem. This observation lies in contrast to suggestions in
the extant literature on modularity that there is lim-
ited need for communication across groups working in
parallel once a system has been decomposed (Sanchez
and Mahoney 1996). However, in the ATLAS case,
such communication and interaction made it possible
for participants to proactively address unexpected issues
that emerged within and across subsystem boundaries as
critical dimensions of the system (e.g., mechanical struc-
ture, electromagnetic fields, thermal regions) changed
over time and as new dimensions gained importance as
the project evolved. As these challenges were resolved,
the detector architecture itself evolved through adjust-
ments made to facilitate the optimal functioning of the
detector as a whole (see also Pickering 1993).
In sum, emergent coordination was made possible
by maintaining interlaced knowledge even after prag-
matic decomposition. Because the interlaced knowledge
structures did not “mirror” the way the technolog-
ical system was pragmatically decomposed (thereby
falling into the “exceptions” category as per Colfer
and Baldwin 2010), designers of different subsystems
could appreciate the evolving system architecture from
different yet co-oriented perspectives (Taylor and Van
Every 2000). As a result, problems in one subsystem
were sometimes identified by individuals who were not
directly involved, as the example of the inner detec-
tor cooling task force illustrates. Also, solutions to
emergent problems were often found when members
of other subsystem communities helped by approach-
ing the problem from a different perspective. In other
words, rather than mirroring, the relationship between
the technical architecture and knowledge structure gen-
erated “interpretative flexibility” (Pinch and Bijker 1987)
as participants sought creative solutions to emergent
problems.
If, instead, the knowledge structure had been modular,
or even “islands of shared knowledge in a sea of mutual
ignorance,” as characterized by Postrel (2002, p. 304),
the development of the system could have been locked
prematurely into a prespecified path, leading to costly
glitches and a system with low integrity. Or a change in
specifications of one subsystem could easily have trig-
gered changes in other interdependent subsystems caus-
ing system development to cycle endlessly (Ethiraj and
Levinthal 2004). The presence of interlaced knowledge
reduced such possibilities (for a related discussion on
the development of complex aircraft systems, see Sosa
et al. 2004). As unforeseen events occurred, such as
changes to the very form and function of one subsys-
tem, participants whose knowledge was interlaced were
able to proactively identify emergent problems caused
by latent interdependencies with their own subsystems as
well as with other subsystems. Equally important, they
were able to find mutually accommodative workarounds
for these emergent problems. In this sense, interlaced
knowledge represented productive redundancy, allowing
subsystem members to mindfully respond (Weick and
Roberts 1993, Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) to unexpected
situations by developing novel solutions.
All of this offers a perspective on the emergence
and the role of architectures in various phases of the
development of complex systems that extends the find-
ings of prior studies. Specifically, we found that creat-
ing an architecture was important for ATLAS to enable
interdependent participants to coordinate. However, in
the ATLAS case, this was not a prespecified archi-
tecture in its traditional role of providing embedded
coordination (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). Instead, the
provisional architecture that emerged because of prag-
matic decomposition facilitated coordination because it
became part of the boundary infrastructure that flex-
ibly connected heterogeneous components and groups
Tuertscher, Garud, and Kumaraswamy: Justification and Interlaced Knowledge at ATLAS, CERN
1600 Organization Science 25(6), pp. 1579–1608, © 2014 INFORMS
(Bowker and Star 1999). The continued interaction and
engaged discourse across interdependent groups and
the collaboration as a whole maintained and deepened
interlaced knowledge, thereby allowing participants to
proactively address problems as the development of the
system progressed. As these problems were resolved, the
architecture itself evolved as adjustments were made to
accommodate the resistances and affordances of the var-
ious components to facilitate the optimal functioning of
the system as a whole.
Implications
What can we learn from the ATLAS case? One way to
answer this question is to revisit the boundary conditions
that characterized ATLAS, thereby locating our obser-
vations within a larger theoretical mosaic of ideas on
coordination, knowledge integration, and the emergence
of technological systems. ATLAS is a case of a complex
system whose architecture could not be easily prespec-
ified and decomposed. Coordination challenges arose
because of the extreme uncertainty associated with the
technology and interdependencies among its components
and subsystems. Further complicating matters, multiple
groups were involved, each with their own epistemic
background and preferred technological approaches to
developing each component or subsystem. No one actor
had either the authority or the knowledge to simply
impose a technical architecture that could then engender
coordination. Equally important, it was not possible to
first create a prototype of the system and then refine it
progressively. All of these issues, in combination, ren-
dered this a judgmental task.
To address this judgmental task, our study identified
a variety of complementary mechanisms to address the
coordination problem that the participants confronted
during the emergence of a radically new, complex sys-
tem. As different challenges arose at various phases
of development, participants deployed different mecha-
nisms to address the specific challenges they confronted.
The dynamics of how coordination challenges emerged
and were addressed over time is a contribution to the
literature.
The cycles of contestation and justification were crit-
ical in this regard. Essentially designed to explicate
the rationale for the choice of a particular technol-
ogy, coordination based on contestation and justification
differs from coordination based on knowledge that is
shared and known to be shared (or common ground, as
in see Srikanth and Puranam 2011) and is thus taken
for granted. Whereas the latter relies on prior inter-
actions and familiarity to engender tacit coordination,
coordination through cycles of contestation and justifica-
tion draws upon explication of underlying assumptions,
logic, and details.
Our study also reveals how the cycles of contestation
and justification generated interlaced knowledge. Prior
literature has addressed shared knowledge at the dyadic
rather than systemic level. By limiting attention to dyads
while ignoring the larger structural context within which
these dyads operate, prior studies have not adequately
explored how the overall network structure influences
mechanisms at the dyadic level (Granovetter 1992, Jones
et al. 1997). An innovative methodology (latent semantic
and network analysis) allowed us to examine knowledge
overlaps not only across dyads but also at the network
level. By measuring shared knowledge of all individuals
within and across collaborating groups, we were able to
highlight the extent of knowledge overlaps as well as
the nature of sharedness. Indeed, our results suggest that
the interlacing of knowledge created an interconnected
tapestry of targeted knowledge overlaps between individ-
uals belonging to different communities, as opposed to
Postrel’s (2002) “islands of shared knowledge in a sea of
mutual ignorance.” These productive redundancies in the
knowledge structure increased what Kotha and Srikanth
(2013) call “visibility,” i.e., the situational awareness of
all activities throughout the network that enables partic-
ipants to fully comprehend the issues confronting them
and also to figure out where they can obtain the relevant
expertise to diagnose and resolve problems.
These findings have implications for addressing a
managerial challenge in coordinating complex techno-
logical systems identified by Postrel (2002)—to decide
what knowledge needs to be shared by whom and
to what extent. In ATLAS, participants working on
various detector subsystems self-selected to participate
in the dialectical processes and the creation of inter-
laced knowledge based on their own interests. Even
participants who were not directly involved in either
proposing or evaluating alternative approaches for a
specific component or subsystem engaged in this pro-
cess, usually when they perceived a technological issue
to be relevant to their own subsystem, but also for
other reasons (e.g., they were simply curious about
a specific technology). In other words, interlacing of
knowledge through justification occurred in a decen-
tralized manner on a peer and voluntary basis with-
out any manager imposing what needed to be shared
by whom. Similarly, resulting knowledge overlaps—the
outcome of this process—were not held by a few cen-
tral individuals acting as managers or integrators; rather,
knowledge overlaps were distributed across a multi-
tude of participants spread across various subsystem
communities.
The distributed nature and productive redundancies
associated with interlaced knowledge create funda-
mentally different implications for coordination within
and across interdependent groups when compared with
knowledge overlaps between just a few individuals who
act as gatekeepers or brokers (Hargadon and Sutton
1997). For example, knowledge (about problems and
how these problems can be addressed) can be accessed
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more efficiently by a decentralized structure with a
set of direct intercommunity ties than by a central
boundary spanner accessing such complex knowledge
mostly through indirect ties (Zhao and Anand 2013).
Furthermore, instead of specialized knowledge and
trans-specialist understanding serving as substitutes (see
Postrel 2002), interlacing of knowledge enables a shared
division of labor (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) among
interdependent groups.
Our findings also hold implications for how knowl-
edge itself is created and transformed in the very act
of coordination. Mechanisms such as communication
and knowledge exchange identified for generating com-
mon ground are essentially information or knowledge
“transfer” mechanisms (Srikanth and Puranam 2011). In
contrast, the cycles of contestation and justification at
ATLAS served as mechanisms for knowledge “trans-
formation” (for a discussion of a qualitatively different
transformation mechanism, see Bechky 2003). In a pro-
cess of transformation, existing knowledge has to be
recontextualized and translated across epistemic bound-
aries, resulting in both the sharing of existing knowledge
and the generation of new knowledge. In this sense, the
cycles of contestation and justification are also differ-
ent from other committees or collective forums (such as
standards bodies) that emphasize exchange and aggrega-
tion of information (e.g., through voting).
Finally, the findings from this study can inform inno-
vation processes within collaborative and distributed
communities (Adler et al. 2008, Lakhani and Panetta
2007) and self-organized networks (Fjeldstad et al.
2012). Despite the increasing importance of these new
forms of organizing for innovation, we still lack an in-
depth understanding of how actors engaging with one
another within these decentralized systems can coor-
dinate their activities (Garud et al. 2013). For exam-
ple, communities and networks comprising actors with
different backgrounds and motivations can easily fork
and fragment (Kogut and Metiu 2001). In this regard,
the findings from this study complement research that
has explored social and technical solutions to reduce
the possibility of fragmentation as collaborative innova-
tion projects unfold (Garud et al. 2008, O’Mahony and
Ferraro 2007, von Krogh et al. 2003).
Conclusion
Of continued interest to scholars and practitioners alike
are multiparty collaborations to develop and deploy
complex technological systems. However, what deserves
greater attention are the dynamics of coordination, espe-
cially with respect to knowledge integration as a sys-
tem unfolds over time. In this regard, this study draws
attention to justification as a way to coordinate in real
time based on a boundary infrastructure that emerges
over time. These cycles of contestation and justification
generate a knowledge structure that is interlaced. This
interlaced knowledge, along with the boundary infras-
tructure, serves as a way for collaborators to cocreate a
system’s architecture.
In addition, for collaborations involving dynamic sys-
tems such as the one we studied, different coordina-
tion mechanisms operate at different points in time.
For instance, the system architecture, once it emerges,
facilitates embedded coordination, thereby enabling the
parallel and distributed development of components.
Knowledge integration issues must be addressed at var-
ious points in time, as latent interdependencies arise.
In this regard, this study shows the importance of
maintaining continued interaction across different com-
munities even as they develop subsystems and compo-
nents in parallel. Such interaction maintains and enriches
existing interlaced knowledge. These processes make
it possible for the members of the collaboration to
proactively deal with issues that emerge as integration
unfolds.
Together, these insights extend our existing under-
standing of other coordination mechanisms and knowl-
edge structures. Overall, they suggest the utility of
looking at a suite of coordination mechanisms and how
they are deployed dynamically over time. In this way,
the insights from this study contribute to the growing
literature on coordination through knowledge integra-
tion as it pertains to the emergence of technological
systems.
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Appendix A. Chronology of Events at ATLAS
1981–1983 Two CERN experiments, UA1 and UA2, become well known for the discovery of the W and Z bosons (awarded
a Nobel Prize in 1984).
March 1984 Workshop on the feasibility of a Large Hadron Collider. First ideas on novel detector concepts for future colliders
based on results of UA1 and UA2.
1988–1989 In a series of workshops, groups of scientists started to converge on technologies that were potentially useful for
future detector concepts.
July 1990 Start of CERN Detector Research and Development Program, a funding vehicle for 50 groups of scientists,
enabling them to conduct larger R&D projects for future detector concepts.
1990–1992 Several R&D projects clustered into four larger collaborations, each proposing a complex detector consisting of
various subsystems.
May 1992 When CERN urged the four collaborations to join forces, two of them, EAGLE and ASCOT, began intense
discussions on the possibility of a merger because of some similarities in their designs, e.g., toroid magnet.
June 1992 Controversies around plans to merge EAGLE and ASCOT emerged because of significant differences between the
two collaborations.
July 1992 Decision to merge the two collaborations to form ATLAS. Start of work on a joint Letter of Intent for the CERN
LHC Committee.
October 1992 ATLAS Letter of Intent was the first official document to be submitted to CERN by the new collaboration.
Decisions on architecture and technologies remained open; several alternatives were listed for each potential
subsystem.
November 1992 ATLAS magnet panel evaluated competing magnet options in concert with the LHC Magnet advisory group.
Decision to drop iron core toroid option in favor of the more radical air core toroid.
February 1993 Start of calorimeter review panel.
July 1993 Start of muon spectrometer review panel.
September 1993 Start of inner detector review panel.
September 1993 Calorimeter review panel recommendation for a hybrid calorimeter consisting of different technologies
(considered revolutionary at that time). Panel recommended that a decision on forward calorimeter be delayed
by one year to enable additional studies.
December 1993 Muon spectrometer review panel issued its recommendation. The recommendation caused a revolt in the
community because it was perceived as not based on justification and it was not transparent.
February 1994 Arbitration among conflicting groups to alleviate controversy in the muon community. To reach consensus,
a “conclave” was initiated, which was chaired by an independent convener.
April 1994 Breakthrough in muon spectrometer situation. Entire community agreed to develop a new concept making best
use of features of each of the three competing technologies.
April 1994 Position of solenoid magnet adversely affected many subsystems. Collaboration realized that a global study
would be required to assess overall physics performance implications.
June 1994 New conceptual design of inner detector took advantage of contributions by new ATLAS members who had
joined the collaboration.
September 1994 Calorimeter review panel recommended integrating forward calorimeter. This change of architecture (integration
of calorimeter into endcap toroid) created positive performance implications for other subsystems.
September 1994 Muon community agreed on trigger chamber technology for the muon spectrometer.
December 1994 ATLAS Technical Proposal, detailing the architecture and components of the ATLAS detector, was submitted to
CERN.
January 1995 Controversies among subsystems around space for electronics and services (cooling, cables, etc.). Several areas
were “overbooked” and subsystems were increasing even further.
June 1995 Concerns about increasing cost of the large superconducting toroid magnet system surfaced. This triggered
discussions about a simplified or downscaled design.
September 1995 Inner detector review panel recommended eliminating one technology to simplify the inner detector architecture.
September 1995 “Global reconsideration of detector” aimed at cost savings with little loss of physics performance; mandate was
given to a “Descoping Taskforce.”
November 1995 Descoping Taskforce recommended (a) reduction of ATLAS dimensions, (b) simplification of subsystems by
reducing and homogenizing components, and (c) reoptimizing overall configuration of detector to preserve
physics performance as well as possible.
March 1996 Muon community proposed reoptimization of muon spectrometer layout.
September 1996 Collaboration approved changes to the calorimeter and inner detector.
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Appendix A (cont’d)
November 1996 Review of competing silicon technology options for inner detector.
December 1996 Approval of Calorimeter Technical Design Report.
February 1997 Concerns about cooling systems suggested by inner detector community. A special task force was set up to
review alternatives for inner detector cooling system.
March 1997 Approval of new optimized layout of the muon spectrometer.
April 1997 Approval of Inner Detector Technical Design Report.
June 1997 Approval of Muon Spectrometer Technical Design Report.
September 1997 Inner detector community proposed a staged design of the semiconductor tracker and pixel detector (i.e., some
layers were removed that could be replaced and upgraded later if required).
November 1997 Inner detector cooling review panel proposed new cooling system for inner detector.
June 1998 ATLAS Memorandum of Understanding was signed by most funding agencies, which constitutes beginning of
construction phase. Construction sites were prepared and tested by producing “module-0” prototypes.
September 1998 Controversy around one institute’s intention to deviate from the design of its deliverable for cost reasons. The
collaboration argued strongly against this plan.
June 1999 The inner detector community proposed changes to the pixel detector component due to manufacturing problems
of radiation hard silicon sensors.
February 2000 ATLAS Memorandum of Understanding was signed by all funding agencies. Most detector systems had entered
the construction phase.
February 2001 A new estimate of cost to completion showed a lack of funding on the order of 20%. A staging scenario with an
initial detector consistent with the needs of the initial low-luminosity physics run was integrated into the work
schedule.
June 2001 Expected delay of LHC completion allowed additional time for completion of ATLAS; this had implications on
design decisions because extra time offered new opportunities.
June 2003 ATLAS cavern (100 m below surface) completed and ready for installation. First components were lowered down
and installed later that year.
September 2003 Change in inner detector due to staging of TRT components guaranteed feasibility of inner detector completion.
The missing components were compensated for by introducing additional layers in other components (pixel
detector).
June 2005 ATLAS high-luminosity R&D projects for future upgrade of ATLAS detector evolved.
February 2008 Completion of LHC.
September 2008 Commissioning of ATLAS detector. Detection of first beam events on September 10, 2008.
Appendix B. Visualization of Flow of Events
ATLAS plenary OOOO OO OO O OO O OO O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000







Descoping task force XXXX
Technical coordination I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Inner detector review panel XXXXX XXXX XX X ID cooling XXX X
Muon review panel
Calorimeter review panel XXXX XX XXXXX X
Legend:
Magnet review panel
Subsystem working group meetings
O ATLAS plenary (main forum for all-hands discussion of all ATLAS issues)
I Regular coordination meetings of group leaders where day-to-day issues were addressed
X Forums specifically set up to address technological challenges (e.g., subsystem review panels)
Working group meetings on the subsystem level
XXXX X
XXXX X
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Appendix C. Measuring the Knowledge Structure of Subsystem Communities













































S1 S2 S3 S4
K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 K9 K10 K11
Community A Community B
(b1) Community A knowledge structure (b2) Community B knowledge structure
(c) Overall knowledge structure community of scientists from all communities
(a) Network representation of scientists (S1, etc.) and their knowledge domains (K1, etc.)
Notes. The matrix indicating the knowledge domains (K1, K2, etc.) of scientists (S1, S2, etc.) who belong to different subsystem com-
munities (Communities A and B) can be conceptualized as a network representing the knowledge structure of various ATLAS subsystem
communities, specifically as a bipartite graph between participants and knowledge domains. As panel (a) illustrates, knowledge domains
in this bipartite graph are connected when participants have expertise in diverse knowledge domains. These connections become denser
and the knowledge domains become more central when knowledge domains of multiple participants overlap. The connections among
various concepts become even more apparent in a unipartite projection of the bipartite graph (see panel (b)). In such a unipartite pro-
jection, the nodes are the knowledge domains, whereas the edges connecting the knowledge domains are the participants. We created
such network representations for different ATLAS subsystem communities (see (b1) and (b2)). Panel (c) represents the knowledge structure
of the overall collaboration, including all subsystem communities. For a more detailed description, see the online appendix, available as
supplemental material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2013.0894.
Endnotes
1The Higgs boson, also known as the God particle, is an ele-
mentary particle in the Standard Model of particle physics
named after Peter Higgs, who predicted it on theoretical
grounds.
2Given our research question, we focus primarily on this aspect
of coordination—i.e., the coordination of the development
of complex technological systems by multiple interdependent
actors—and the mechanisms for accomplishing such coordi-
nation. For a comprehensive review of coordination mecha-
nisms in a broader organizational context, see Okhuysen and
Bechky (2009).
3An established architecture may emerge in many ways,
e.g., as a dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback 1978,
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Tushman and Anderson 1986), defined by a standards body
(Farrell and Saloner 1988), or based on prior generations of a
system (Sosa et al. 2004).
4Common ground can be manifest at different levels of
aggregation—for instance, at the dyadic level (Srikanth and
Puranam 2011), between communities of knowledge (Hoopes
and Postrel 1999), or at the organizational level (Grant 1996b).
5This is similar to the notion of “interactional expertise”
that emerges from “linguistic socialization” (Collins and
Evans 2007, p. 88).
6Garud and Munir (2008) described how at first the devel-
opment of a new battery for Polaroid’s SX-70 camera was
assigned to ESB, which had expertise in developing batteries.
However, when the combination of the film and the battery
started to create problems, Polaroid decided to internalize the
design and development of the battery and the film pod to
overcome the problem.
7We analyzed levels of justification and knowledge struc-
tures of communities working on all three major ATLAS
subsystems; however, the levels of transparency, scrutiny,
and justification were initially perceived (by those involved
and the collaboration at large) to be significantly lower
within the muon spectrometer subsystem community than
within the calorimeter subsystem and inner detector subsystem
communities.
8A more detailed explanation of our methods pertaining to
latent semantic analysis is included in the online appendix.
9Although it was known at the outset that different subsys-
tems were required to perform certain functions (e.g., muon
spectrometer for measuring muons), it was not clear what
approaches/technologies should be used to design the various
subsystems or how to configure the various subsystems and
the connections between them. In other words, the ATLAS
architecture was not given. Indeed, different collaborations at
the LHC used different approaches, each with its own distinct
detector architecture. For instance, another collaboration, CMS
(Compact Muon Solenoid), shared the ATLAS collaboration’s
objective (i.e., to detect the Higgs boson), and its detector
too had components labeled calorimeter, muon spectrometer,
etc.; however, the CMS detector’s architecture (i.e., constituent
components, interfaces, and configurations) was fundamentally
different from that of the ATLAS detector (ATLAS Collabo-
ration 1994, CMS Collaboration 1994).
10In fact, an early attempt—the “parity commission” proposed
before the merger to ensure that the interests of both proto-
collaborations were maintained and brought together—failed
and was discarded after being unfavorably perceived by par-
ticipants as a move to centralize decision making.
11Participants allowed for some flexibility by agreeing to what
they called “envelopes,” i.e., acceptable tolerances for agreed-
upon specifications for different detector subsystems.
12Binary ice is a coolant consisting of ice crystals in a cooling
liquid pumped through a complex system of pipes.
13This difference was perceived by both community insiders
and the collaboration at large.
14This was an exception in the history of ATLAS, as it was the
only case in which the collaboration board declined to accept
the recommendation made by a review panel.
15Synonymy is a situation where different words describe the
same idea, whereas polysemy is a situation where the same
words describe different ideas.
16We also calculated closeness centrality (Freeman 1979), an
alternative network measure that indicates how easily infor-
mation located in a network can be accessed by any node in
the network, either directly or indirectly. Our analysis using
closeness centrality is consistent with our reported findings.
17At ATLAS, the detector was considered to be its own pro-
totype. It was impossible to create a working prototype that
could then be tested, refined, and scaled up before final com-
missioning. As a result, they had to get it right the first time.
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